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I. INTRODUCTION 
Artificial intelligence is entering medical practice. The combina-
tion of medical big data and machine learning techniques allows de-
velopers to create AI usable in medical contexts — also called “black-
box medicine” due to its inherent opacity — that can help improve 
human health and health care. Only a few years ago, black-box medi-
cine seemed far from real-world use. Today, there are already FDA-
approved devices that use AI to diagnose diabetic retinopathy or to 
flag radiologic images for further study.1 Hospitals have used AI to 
help develop care pathways for increasingly specified groups of pa-
tients. Future uses are multiplying. 
But there is a problem lurking in the development of AI in medi-
cine.2 A key promise of medical AI is its ability to democratize medi-
cal expertise, allowing providers of all sorts to give care that 
otherwise might be beyond their capacity.3 Medical AI is typically 
trained in high-resource settings: academic medical centers or state-
                                                                                                    
1. See infra Section III.C.1. 
2. Actually, there are lots of problems, including how to set proper incentives, how to 
regulate for safety and efficacy, how to use the tort system to encourage providers and hos-
pitals to adopt the best medical AI products, challenges to the doctor-patient relationship, 
and questions of diminishing human expertise. For an initial overview on those problems 
and an introduction to medical AI generally, see W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medi-
cine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419 (2015) [hereinafter Price, Black-Box Medicine] (introduc-
ing medical AI and canvassing several issues). This Article is focused on a different 
problem. 
3. See, e.g., Victoria J. Mar &. Peter H. Soyer, Artificial Intelligence for Melanoma Di-
agnosis: How Can We Deliver on the Promise?, 29 ANNALS ONCOLOGY 1625, 1625 (2018) 
(“[A]rtificial intelligence (AI) promises a more standardised level of diagnostic accuracy, 
such that all people, regardless of where they live or which doctor they see, will be able to 
access reliable diagnostic assessment.”). 
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of-the-art hospitals or hospital systems.4 These sites typically have 
well-trained, experienced practitioners and are most likely to have 
high-quality data collection systems; training medical AI in these sys-
tems makes intuitive sense. Democratizing medical expertise, though, 
requires deploying that medical AI in low-resource settings like com-
munity hospitals, community health centers, practitioners’ offices, or 
rural health centers in less-developed countries.5 This translation runs 
into a problem: low-resource contexts have different patient popula-
tions and different resources available for treatment than high-
resource contexts, and disparities in available data make it hard for AI 
to account for those differences. 
The translational disconnect between high-resource training envi-
ronments and low-resource deployment environments will likely re-
sult in predictable decreases in the quality of algorithmic 
recommendations for care, limiting the promise of medical AI to actu-
ally democratize excellence. To take a simple example: at Memorial 
Sloan Kettering, one of the best cancer centers in the world, it may 
well make sense to give a patient a cocktail of powerful chemothera-
peutics with potentially fatal side effects, since trained oncology nurs-
es and other specialists are available to monitor problems and 
intervene if things go wrong. In a community hospital without those 
safeguards, though, it may be a better call to administer less drastic 
remedies, avoiding the chance of catastrophic failure. That danger is 
even more pronounced in even lower-resource settings, such as rural 
areas of less-developed countries. But medical AI trained only on data 
from Memorial Sloan Kettering would have no way of taking that 
resource constraint into account and would provide a poor recommen-
dation to providers in those lower-resource settings.6 
Contextual bias is an under-addressed kind of bias in the legal AI 
literature.7 Rather than the bias arising from problems in the underly-
ing data, such as when policing algorithms end up silently replicating 
                                                                                                    
4. See MICHAEL E. MATHENY ET AL., NAT’L ACAD. OF MED., AI & MACHINE LEARNING 
IN HEALTH CARE, Section 2.E.2 (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 46) (on file with author) 
(noting that “[i]n the United States, MIT, Stanford and Carnegie Mellon pioneered AI re-
search in the 1960s, and these, and many others, continue to do so today”). 
5. I focus in this Article on medical AI that is used in health-care settings, not consumer-
focused devices, though some of the same issues arise in the latter context as well. 
6. It is not impossible to take resource constraints into account in AI decision-making, 
but, as the rest of this Article demonstrates, doing so is complicated and requires more data 
than are available from just high-resource settings.  
7. For a “whirlwind tour” of AI bias issues, see Karen Hao, This Is How AI Bias Really 
Happens and Why It’s So Hard to Fix, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612876/this-is-how-ai-bias-really-happensand-why-
its-so-hard-to-fix [https://perma.cc/XNG3-XWY7]. In the computer science literature, see, 
for example, Adarsh Subbaswamy & Suchi Saria, Counterfactual Normalization: Proactive-
ly Addressing Dataset Shift and Improving Reliability Using Causal Mechanisms, ARXIV, 
Aug. 9, 2018, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.03253v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/CCZ5-W6JP] (re-
vised from print version). 
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racial bias in underlying arrest patterns and the data they generate8 or 
when health algorithms accurately mirror racial or gender biases al-
ready present in health care,9 this bias arises in the process of translat-
ing algorithms from one context to another. The care provided in 
high-resource contexts may be superb and untinged by problematic 
human bias of any kind, and this bias would still arise.10 
I do not mean to suggest that AI developers are unaware of the 
challenges of translating AI from one context to another, or the differ-
ences between high- and low-resource contexts. The technique of 
“transfer learning,” for instance, focuses on taking insights from one 
environment and using them in another.11 And some work, especially 
nonprofit work in the global health space, focuses intently on develop-
ing robust AI especially for deployment in low-resource contexts in 
less-developed countries.12 But this Article places the dynamics of 
cross-context translation into a legal context where, particularly in the 
United States, incentives actively promote problematic development 
patterns; it also suggests why the data most useful to address problems 
of contextual bias are least likely to be available.  
This Article analyzes how medical AI can run into problems 
through an otherwise reasonable process of development and deploy-
ment. It proceeds in four Parts. Part II briefly describes the promise of 
artificial intelligence in medicine, focusing on the idea of democratiz-
ing medical expertise. Part III explores the incentives for developing 
                                                                                                    
8. See, e.g., Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 
109, 119–43 (2018). 
9. See, e.g., Ziad Obermeyer et al., Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Man-
age the Health of Populations, 366 SCI. 447, 447 (2019) (finding that a widely used algo-
rithm used to predict patient risk was biased based on race because the algorithm predicted 
health care costs, and less is spent on African-American patients than comparable white 
patients). 
10. High-resource care may be biased. See, e.g., David A. Ansell & Edwin K. McDonald, 
Bias, Black Lives, and Academic Medicine, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1087, 1087–89 (2015). 
But contextual bias can occur independently from any bias in the high-resource care on 
which the training data are generated, as described in Parts IV and V. 
11. See, e.g., Jenna Wiens et al., A Study in Transfer Learning: Leveraging Data from 
Multiple Hospitals to Enhance Hospital-Specific Predictions, 21 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS 
ASS’N 699, 699 (2014) (examining the transfer of learning among three hospitals); Dianbo 
Liu et al., FADL: Federated-Autonomous Deep Learning for Distributed Electronic Health 
Record, ARXIV, Nov. 28, 2018, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.11400.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
DHA6-R3ZV] (suggesting a federated network where generalized insights can be applied in 
individual contexts); Awni Y. Hannun et al., Cardiologist-Level Arrhythmia Detection and 
Classification in Ambulatory Electrocardiograms Using a Deep Neural Network, 25 
NATURE MED. 65, 69 (2019) (noting need to calibrate algorithms to local populations). 
12. See, e.g., Valentina Bellemo et al., Artificial Intelligence Using Deep Learning to 
Screen for Referable and Vision-Threatening Diabetic Retinopathy in Africa: A Clinical 
Validation Study, 1 LANCET DIGITAL HEALTH e35 (2019) (validating in Zambia a model 
trained on diabetic patients from Singapore); ELEONORE PAUWELS, U.N. UNIV. CTR. FOR 
POLICY RESEARCH, THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF CONVERGING RISKS: THE UN AND 
PREVENTION IN THE ERA OF AI 28 (2019), https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/attachment/ 
3472/PauwelsAIGeopolitics.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y7S-7JAP]. 
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medical AI in high-resource medical contexts. It explores how techno-
logical factors around data availability are buttressed by legal and 
economic incentives to focus AI training on high-resource contexts. 
Part IV, the heart of the paper, lays out the different types of er-
rors that can arise when medical AI trained in high-resource contexts 
is deployed in low-resource contexts. It notes problematic differences 
in patient populations, differences in recommended treatments based 
on the available resources of the medical environment, and systematic 
influences on cost. 
Part V addresses a question of scope: isn’t all medicine contextu-
al? Treatments are developed and doctors are trained in one set of 
contexts — often high-resource — and then care occurs in a wide ar-
ray of different contexts. In one sense, medical AI embodies the same 
type of contextual bias. But medical AI carries the illusory promise of 
being different because it can theoretically take into account exactly 
those contextual differences to tailor care and can learn from its own 
performance. However, this safeguard fails if medical AI lacks data 
from different contexts to adjust its recommendations. The resulting 
contextual bias is especially insidious because medical AI is typically 
opaque, hiding the negative effects that may result. 
Part VI discusses potential solutions. It begins with two obvious 
but flawed solutions. First, could we rely on human doctors “in the 
loop” to provide common-sense checks on medical AI contextual bias 
errors? Unfortunately, even assuming that doctors have the 
knowledge, incentive, and willingness to correct AI errors — assump-
tions that may not be merited — in many low-resource situations 
where AI can bring the most benefit, well-trained human providers 
will simply not be present. Second, could we simply rely on labeling 
to inform users of its limitations? I argue that labeling is unlikely to 
solve the problem, since training-based labels are difficult to design, 
likely to be ignored, and, if followed, would eviscerate much of the 
promise of democratizing expertise. This Part suggests instead that a 
better solution requires a combination of public investment in data 
infrastructure and regulatory mandates of data showing that AI focus-
es well across different contexts. This combination would ameliorate 
the problem of contextual translation and help ensure that medical AI 
actually does provide benefits more broadly, rather than just to those 
who can already access high-resource care. 
Part VI also notes that while the problem of contextual bias needs 
addressing, policymakers should not be misled by the Nirvana falla-
cy.13 Some forms of even imperfect medical AI promise substantial 
                                                                                                    
13. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & 
ECON. 1, 1 (1969) (defining the “nirvana approach” as seeking “to discover discrepancies 
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benefit to underserved patients, and the field’s growth should not be 
strangled while we await perfection. 
Before proceeding, one caveat is in order. Medical AI is on the 
cusp of entering practice, and a few specific examples of medical AI 
are already available. But it is early yet, and some of the features key 
to this discussion are largely in development, especially AI that rec-
ommends a particular treatment for a particular patient. The predicates 
of the argument made here — medical AI, training in high-resource 
contexts, differences in patient population and resources, and impact 
of resources on treatment plans — are all already present. I argue that 
their combination is likely to lead to problems in the process of con-
textual translation, barring action specifically taken to avoid those 
problems. But I cannot yet point to instances where such problems 
have happened, and it is possible that careful developers and regula-
tors will ensure that they never do, even without explicit policy inter-
vention.14 Nevertheless, the risk needs to be identified and brought to 
the fore now. Medical AI is developing rapidly and will become in-
creasingly embedded in medical practice; the problem of pervasively 
biased treatment will be easier to avoid than to fix. 
II. THE PROMISE OF BLACK-BOX MEDICINE 
Medical AI promises big things. Big data and machine learning 
can help health-care providers explore new biological relationships 
and new methods of treatment, automate many low-level tasks that fill 
providers’ days, and raise the general level of care by allowing many 
types of providers to access expertise through the intermediary of 
medical AI.15 Each of these possibilities can bring substantial changes 
to the world of health care. This Part briefly describes the first two, 
and then focuses in depth on the third, which the rest of this Article 
addresses. 
A. Advancing Medical Knowledge 
Black-box medicine’s headline promise is to stretch the bounda-
ries of medical care by uncovering and using new information about 
                                                                                                    
between the ideal and the real” and finding “the real is inefficient” without comparing rele-
vant choices between real institutional arrangements). 
14. Cf. Jorge L. Contreras, The Anticommons at 20: Concerns for Research Continue, 
361 SCI. 335, 336 (2018) (noting that concerns about innovation stagnation theorized by 
Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg twenty years earlier had not come to pass in part due 
to community efforts to avoid them). 
15. See generally W. Nicholson Price II, Artificial Intelligence in the Medical System: 
Four Roles for Potential Transformation, 18 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS, 21 YALE 
J.L. & TECH., Special Issue 122 (2019). (describing these three roles and also noting the use 
of AI in resource allocation). 
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how humans work and how to care for them. Human biology is tre-
mendously complex and our tools for understanding it are limited; 
artificial intelligence promises to find and use complex underlying 
relationships to improve care, discover new treatments, and advance 
scientific hypotheses even if we don’t understand those underlying 
relationships.16 
Medical AI is already pushing boundaries. IBM’s Watson for 
Drug Discovery used AI to identify genes likely to be associated with 
Alzheimer’s disease and flagged them as potential targets for new 
drugs.17 AI systems can similarly allow things we can’t do now; a 
wearable device could predict the onset of stroke by analyzing a per-
son’s gait18 or AI software could notice the onset of Parkinson’s dis-
ease by monitoring trembling of a computer mouse and the 
characteristics of web searches.19 AI systems could also predict which 
patients might react better to a particular treatment by noticing subtle 
groupings among patients that are currently undetectable through 
standard analysis.20 All of these possibilities promise to push past the 
current frontiers of medical knowledge. 
B. Automating the Routine 
A second, more quotidian promise of medical AI is automating 
medical drudgery. The problem here is that much of medical practice 
consists of tasks that aren’t really about practicing medicine; instead, 
they focus on paperwork and routine tasks that often don’t do much to 
help patients and contribute to physician burnout. Providers are del-
uged with data searching and data entry tasks; one study found that 
physicians spent almost half of their time on electronic health record 
work and desk work, and only a quarter of their time seeing patients.21 
                                                                                                    
16. See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 2, at 434–37. 
17. See, e.g., Nadine Bakkar et al., Artificial Intelligence in Neurodegenerative Disease 
Research: Use of IBM Watson to Identify Additional RNA-Binding Proteins Altered in Amy-
otrophic Lateral Sclerosis, 135 ACTA NEUROPATHOLOGICA 227, 229 (2018) (describing 
IBM Watson’s processing of the scientific literature to identify new genes linked to ALS). 
18. See Fei Jiang et al., Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare: Past, Present, and Future, 2 
STROKE & VASCULAR NEUROLOGY 230, 240 (2017). 
19. See Ryen W. White et al., Detecting Neurodegenerative Disorders from Web Search 
Signals, NATURE: NPJ DIGITAL MED., Apr. 23, 2018, at 1, 1. 
20. Jiang et al., supra note 18, at 239–40 (noting proposed AI-based stroke treatment 
models); id. at 241 (describing AI-based cancer treatment prediction). AI may also enhance 
existing medical device usage. Charlotte A. Tschider, Deus ex Machina: Regulating Cyber-
security and Artificial Intelligence for Patients of the Future, 5 SAVANNAH L. REV. 177, 189 
(2018) (describing the evolution of medical devices from self-executing, device-bound code 
to AI and distributed infrastructure models). 
21. Christine Sinsky et al., Allocation of Physician Time in Ambulatory Practice: A Time 
and Motion Study in 4 Specialties, 165 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 753, 753 (2016); see also 
Ming Tai-Seale et al., Electronic Health Record Logs Indicate that Physicians Split Time 
Evenly Between Seeing Patients and Desktop Medicine, 36 HEALTH AFF. 655, 655 (2017) 
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Even in the examination room, physicians spent only about half of 
their time interacting with patients — and about a third interacting 
with electronic health records and desk work.22 The ability of AI to 
automate at least some of this work could have a profound effect on 
the provision of health care, potentially improving the doctor-patient 
relationship23 and reducing the rate of provider burnout.24 
Automation of routine tasks, though not as exciting as pushing 
medical frontiers, could still change medical practice for the better. 
Some action could happen on the front end: AI could automatically 
identify and highlight the most relevant medical information from 
patient medical records to reduce the time spent scrolling through rec-
ords looking for information.25  It could provide the most relevant 
medical literature to doctors based on natural-language processing.26 
And speech-recognition software based on AI could automatically 
transcribe patient conversations and provider notes and fill out forms 
afterward.27 Assuming eventual accuracy on the part of AI, such assis-
tance could also reduce the rate of transcriptional errors and even im-
prove privacy as details are read by machines rather than medical 
scribes. 
                                                                                                    
(finding that physicians “logged an average of 3.08 hours on office visits and 3.17 hours on 
desktop medicine each day”). 
22. See Sinsky et al., supra note 21, at 753. 
23. Cf. Maria Alcocer Alkureishi et al., Impact of Electronic Medical Record Use on the 
Patient–Doctor Relationship and Communication: A Systematic Review, 31 J. GEN. 
INTERNAL MED. 548, 550–57 (2016) (evaluating many studies and finding both positive and 
negative impacts of EHRs on patient-doctor relationships). 
24. In a 2018 survey, “too many bureaucratic tasks” was the most commonly cited con-
tributor to physician burnout. Carol Peckham, National Physician Burnout and Depression 
Report 2018, MEDSCAPE (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.medscape.com/slideshow/2018-
lifestyle-burnout-depression-6009235#13. 
25. See Kory Kreimeyer et al., Natural Language Processing Systems for Capturing and 
Standardizing Unstructured Clinical Information: A Systematic Review, 73 J. BIOMEDICAL 
INFORMATICS 14, 14 (2017); cf. Theresa A. Koleck et al., Natural Language Processing of 
Symptoms Documented in Free-Text Narratives of Electronic Health Records: A Systematic 
Review, 26 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 364, 365 (2019) (explaining that the previous-
ly manual process of extracting symptom information from patient records could be auto-
mated through natural language processing to reduce time spent by clinical experts). 
26. Cf. Kreimeyer et al., supra note 25, at 15. 
27. Id.; see also Linda Dawson et al., A Usability Framework for Speech Recognition 
Technologies in Clinical Handover: A Pre-Implementation Study, 38 J. MED. SYS., June 
2014, at 1, 1. Yet another potential use for medical AI comes in its use to analyze and direct 
medical resources: assigning scarce resources to patients based on likelihood of aiding them, 
improving workflow, or even finding ways to optimize medical billing. Cf. I. Glenn Cohen 
et al., The Legal and Ethical Concerns That Arise from Using Complex Predictive Analytics 
in Health Care, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1139, 1140 (2014). These interventions, focused less 
directly on care encounters, are outside the scope of this work. 
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C. Democratizing Expertise 
Finally, medical AI promises to democratize medical expertise. 
Today, there are tremendous differences in the quality and level of 
care patients receive based on the context in which they receive that 
care.28 This is reflected in everything from the availability of a spe-
cialist (e.g., whether a patient can see a board-certified ophthalmolo-
gist or dermatologist rather than relying on a primary care physician 
for more complex care) to the type of practitioner involved (e.g., phy-
sician versus nurse practitioner) to the qualifications of the provider 
(e.g., top-of-her-class with elite fellowships to less-exalted qualifica-
tions).29 Medical AI promises to reduce this variation by “leveling 
up” — allowing a much broader swath of providers to provide care at 
the level of excellent specialists, which is what I mean by democrati-
zation of medical expertise. Medical AI is scalable in a way that hu-
man expertise simply is not; although gathering data, training 
algorithms, and validating algorithmic performance are all hard and 
expensive tasks,30 duplicating an existing algorithm for use in another 
setting is much easier and cheaper than training new people for the 
same tasks.31 It’s not free or easy — information infrastructure still 
needs to be set up,32 and the data the algorithm will analyze need to be 
properly collected and formatted on-site33 — but an algorithm is easi-
er to copy than an oncologist. 
This Section describes how AI can democratize different types of 
medical expertise. It then considers where AI can bring expertise — a 
span that ranges from other high-resource settings like mid-level hos-
                                                                                                    
28. See, e.g., John E. Wennberg, Unwarranted Variations in Healthcare Delivery: Impli-
cations for Academic Medical Centres, 325 BMJ 961, 962–63 (2002); DARTMOUTH ATLAS 
PROJECT, https://www.dartmouthatlas.org [https://perma.cc/YA3A-5JCY] (cataloging re-
gional differences in care). 
29. I recognize that quality of care is not uni-dimensional; for a gastrointestinal problem, 
a patient would likely rather see a novice nurse practitioner than an experienced neurosur-
geon, and with good reason. Nevertheless, there are many situations for which the expertise 
of a well-trained specialist can improve care. 
30 . See W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1411 (2016) [hereinafter Price, Big Data]. 
31. Such duplication is not costless, of course, and in some situations doing the transfer 
right might actually be more expensive than home-growing a solution. See, e.g., JAMES E. 
TCHENG ET AL., NAT’L ACAD. OF MED., OPTIMIZING STRATEGIES FOR CLINICAL DECISION 
SUPPORT: SUMMARY OF A MEETING SERIES 28 (2017) (“While the creation of CDS [clinical 
decision support] content in-house is an expensive and resource-intensive endeavor, sharing 
CDS content, either with peers or through the licensing of vendor content, is presently per-
ceived to be equally or more expensive; thus this duplication of effort at each site has per-
sisted.”). 
32. See W. Nicholson Price II, Risk and Resilience in Health Data Infrastructure, 16 
COLO. TECH. L.J. 65, 71 (2017) [hereinafter Price, Risk and Resilience]. 
33. Further down the road, AI can help here too; natural language processing will make it 
easier to accept unstructured data about patients rather than requiring data to be in a certain 
format. See supra Section II.B. 
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pitals to very low-resource settings like rural providers in less-
developed countries. 
1. Diagnostics and Treatment Recommendations 
AI can democratize different types of medical expertise. Though 
medical expertise comes in many flavors, with many interconnections, 
we can usefully consider two rough classes: diagnostics and treatment 
recommendations.34 
a. Diagnostics 
Diagnosis is the process of figuring out what’s wrong with a pa-
tient.35  If a patient comes in complaining of an exceptionally bad 
headache, is she suffering from tension headache, a migraine, or a 
subdural hematoma? One demands over-the-counter painkillers, an-
other a large set of unpredictable medications, and the last an immedi-
ate trip to the emergency department to avoid death or severe brain 
injury. Fans of the television series House will readily recognize the 
recurrent problem of finding out what malady (or combination of 
maladies) underlies a collection of symptoms. Diagnosis is hard 
(though Dr. House makes it look easy); it depends on recognizing the 
right symptoms and using them to identify underlying problems from 
a vast realm of possibilities. Excellent diagnosticians, when available, 
are tremendously valuable to medical care — but not everyone can be 
an excellent diagnostician. Providers may reach incorrect diagnoses 
because they never acquired the relevant medical knowledge, the 
knowledge they acquired is outdated, they lack time to conduct the 
relevant research, they suffer from heuristic biases such as recalling 
                                                                                                    
34. Both of these forms of expertise can also be advanced by AI. See supra Section II.A. 
This section focuses on their democratization. There are more things AI can do in medicine. 
Prognostics, for instance, are an area of active development; it is good to be able to predict 
what will happen to a patient, to know how long they might live, and who may become 
sicker. Cf. Ziad Obermeyer & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Predicting the Future — Big Data, Ma-
chine Learning, and Clinical Medicine, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1216, 1217 (2016) (discuss-
ing machine learning and prognostics generally); Alvin Rajkomar et al., Scalable and 
Accurate Deep Learning with Electronic Health Records, NATURE: NPJ DIGITAL MED., May 
8, 2018, at 1, 1 (presenting a model with high accuracy predicting patient mortality, un-
planned readmission, and prolonged length of stay). This Article focuses on diagnostics and 
treatment recommendations as two possibilities for medical AI focused most closely on 
direct patient care. 
35. Diagnosis is not always entirely separable from treatment. In many circumstances, 
the mere provision of a correct diagnosis can provide relief to patients who know more 
about what is happening to them and can enable useful self-care. See, e.g., Sumi Sexton & 
Robert Loflin III, The Relief of Getting a Diagnosis, 80 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 1223, 1223 
(2009); see also racheldoesstuff, A Diagnosis, YOUTUBE (Nov. 17, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uic_3vlI5BE [https://perma.cc/F4BS-U2LW]. 
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memorable rare diseases rather than common ones,36 or, most simply, 
they are unfamiliar with the area of care. Artificial intelligence, based 
largely on pattern recognition, can help democratize diagnostic exper-
tise, allowing access to this expertise even when an excellent human 
diagnostician is not available.37 
EyeDiagnosis’s IDx-DR software for diabetic retinopathy is an 
example of leveling-up that AI can bring to medical diagnosis.38 Dia-
betic retinopathy is a condition wherein diabetes causes loss of small 
blood vessels in the retina; new blood vessels that grow to replace 
them can cause vision problems.39 The current standard of care is for 
patients with diabetes to visit an ophthalmologist yearly to check for 
signs of retinopathy, so that treatment can begin before the retina 
worsens. 40  But this requires regularly visiting an ophthalmologist, 
which is not easy or even possible for many patients.  
EyeDiagnosis has developed a system that enables primary care 
physicians (or other non-specialist practitioners) to use an essentially 
automated camera to take images of the retina; those images are then 
analyzed by a machine-learning algorithm trained on a gold-standard 
dataset of retina images (annotated by expert ophthalmologists).41 The 
algorithm returns a diagnosis of more-than-mild diabetic retinopathy, 
in which case the patient should seek further care, or not, in which 
case the patient should ideally be retested in a year.42 IDx-DR is ap-
proved by FDA for this level of autonomous diagnosis and performs 
at a level comparable to ophthalmologists, even when operated by 
novices.43 In this scenario, the diagnostic expertise is that possessed 
by most ophthalmologists (and by their supporting camera techni-
cians). IDx-DR brings that level of diagnostic expertise to primary 
care physicians without the relevant experience.44 
                                                                                                    
36. See, e.g., Jill G Klein, Five Pitfalls in Decisions About Diagnosis and Prescribing, 
330 BMJ 781, 782 (2005). 
37. AI diagnosis is not just about democratizing expertise. AI could also replace very 
easy, routine diagnostics (automating drudgery) or point us to disease variants previously 
unrecognized (advancing medical knowledge). But to the extent that many maladies are 
diagnosable by expert diagnosticians but not by those with less experience or expertise, AI 
can help bridge that gap. 
38. IDx-DR, IDX, https://www.eyediagnosis.net/idx-dr [https://perma.cc/9GZR-MTUB]. 
39. AM. ACAD. OF OPHTHALMOLOGY, QUALITY OF CARE SECRETARIAT, INFORMATION 
STATEMENT: SCREENING FOR DIABETIC RETINOPATHY 1, 1 (2014), https://www.aao.org/ 
clinical-statement/screening-diabetic-retinopathy [https://perma.cc/XW88-VZ27]. 
40. Id. at 2. 
41. IDx-DR, supra note 38. 
42. Id. 
43. See Performance, IDX, https://www.eyediagnosis.net/performance [https://perma.cc/ 
3Q83-6QLB]. 
44. In clinical trials for the IDx-DR, the developer specifically sought out technicians 
who had not been trained on any retinal imaging system — the opposite of an imaging ex-
pert. Id. 
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b. Treatment Recommendations  
After diagnosis comes treatment. Once providers have determined 
what ails the patient, they must select from a menu of possibilities to 
determine the best option for improvement.45 Consider a well-trained 
and experienced oncologist; knowing that a patient has a certain type 
of cancer, she also (hopefully) knows what the best course of treat-
ment is: surgery, radiotherapy, chemotherapy, or some combina-
tion — and within each class, which drugs or protocols are likely most 
effective, given what she knows about the patient. That expertise, like 
diagnostic expertise, is hard-won and hard to apply; becoming a 
skilled oncologist takes time, money, and practice. Such expertise is 
accordingly hard to come by, especially outside specialized cancer 
centers like Memorial Sloan Kettering or MD Anderson. 
Medical AI offers possibilities of democratizing expertise here as 
well. Indeed, one well-known example of medicine, IBM’s Watson 
for Oncology (“Watson Oncology”), addresses exactly this chal-
lenge.46 I should note that this example is in some ways a problematic 
one. There appears to be some discrepancy between how IBM says 
Watson Oncology works and how it actually works in practice, though 
details are scarce.47 I will analyze the program as described by IBM, 
on the basis that this description is at least aspirational; where others 
offer critiques of this account, I’ll note them in footnotes. Whatever 
the precise contours of Watson Oncology, it is by far the highest-
profile example of using AI to democratize medical expertise existing 
today. 
Watson Oncology uses machine-learning-based natural language 
processing to analyze patient medical records to determine cancer 
type and then provides recommendations for treatment.48 The system 
is an AI/decision-rule hybrid: AI is involved in the initial stages, but 
the treatment recommendation is based not on any particular machine-
learning approach, but instead on what oncologists at Memorial Sloan 
Kettering would do when faced with a similar patient.49 IBM aims 
                                                                                                    
45. This picture is naturally somewhat stylized; sometimes, for instance, providers may 
need to jump straight from symptoms to treatment without knowing the underlying problem, 
as when treating severe dehydration without first determining the cause. 
46. IBM Watson Health, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/watson/health/oncology-and-
genomics [https://perma.cc/F39K-UF64]. 
47. Casey Ross & Ike Swetlitz, IBM’s Watson Supercomputer Recommended ‘Unsafe 
and Incorrect’ Cancer Treatments, Internal Documents Show, STAT (July 25, 2018), 
https://www.statnews.com/2018/07/25/ibm-watson-recommended-unsafe-incorrect-
treatments [https://perma.cc/EVP7-AB72]. 
48. IBM Watson Health, supra note 46. According to STAT, Watson Oncology is actual-
ly trained on synthetic patient records (that is, records created by doctors to match typical 
patient patterns) rather than actual patient records. Ross & Swetlitz, supra note 47. 
49. A. Michael Froomkin et al., When AIs Outperform Doctors: Confronting the Chal-
lenges of a Tort-Induced Over-Reliance on Machine Learning, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 33, 43 
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explicitly to use Watson Oncology to democratize medical expertise 
(for a price, of course). It licenses Watson Oncology for use at hun-
dreds of hospitals worldwide50 and has evaluated its performance at 
hospitals (relatively high-resource hospitals, to be sure) in Thailand,51 
India,52 and Mexico.53 Results from initial trials in Mexico conclude 
that “Oncologists . . . felt [Watson Oncology] would be particularly 
beneficial in clinics that lack subspecialist expertise.”54 Watson On-
cology is thus especially targeted at contexts that lack existing oncol-
ogist expertise. 
Democratization of the expertise needed to recommend treat-
ments, though, does not always translate to democratization of the 
expertise needed to actually treat. If medical AI recommends taking 
tablet A over tablet B for a particular patient, as long as both tablets 
are available, that recommendation may be easy to follow. But if med-
ical AI recommends a complicated surgery, successful implementa-
tion depends on the presence of a skilled surgeon. This problem is 
explored in more detail below, and is a key challenge for democratiz-
ing medical expertise.55 
2. Contexts of Application 
AI has the potential to democratize medical expertise to many 
medical contexts, ranging from other high-resource contexts like ma-
                                                                                                    
(2019) (“[Watson Oncology] is really a decision-support tool enhanced with prepro-
grammed suggestions based on what a committee of doctors at Sloan Kettering said they 
would do when presented with various symptoms and scenarios.”). 
50. See Watson Health: Get the Facts, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/blogs/watson-health/ 
watson-health-get-facts [https://perma.cc/KU84-MEBD]; see also Manipal Hospitals 
Adopts Watson for Oncology to Help Physicians Identify Options for Individualized, Evi-
dence-Based Cancer Care Across India, IBM (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www-03.ibm.com/ 
press/us/en/pressrelease/48189.wss [https://perma.cc/5JJP-KWXD]. 
51. Suthida Suwanvecho et al., Concordance Assessment of a Cognitive Computing Sys-
tem in Thailand, 35 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY SUPPLEMENT 6589 (2017), 
https://meetinglibrary.asco.org/record/150478/abstract [https://perma.cc/Y3AU-4W9T] 
(abstract presented at the 2017 American Society for Clinical Oncology Annual Meeting). 
Notably, some disagreement between Thai oncologist recommendations and Watson Oncol-
ogy’s recommendations was attributed to “local oncologist preferences.” Id. 
52. S.P. Somashekhar et al., Early Experience with IBM Watson for Oncology (WFO) 
Cognitive Computing System for Lung and Colorectal Cancer Treatment, 35 J. CLINICAL 
ONCOLOGY SUPPLEMENT 8527 (2017), http://ascopubs.org/doi/abs/10.1200/ 
JCO.2017.35.15_suppl.8527 [https://perma.cc/DS38-VFW5] (abstract presented at the 2017 
American Society for Clinical Oncology Annual Meeting). 
53. Catherine Sarre-Lazcano et al., Cognitive Computing in Oncology: A Qualitative As-
sessment of IBM Watson for Oncology in Mexico, 35 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY e18166 
(2017), https://meetinglibrary.asco.org/record/152386/abstract [https://perma.cc/G7B9-
LW6B] (abstract presented at the 2017 American Society for Clinical Oncology Annual 
Meeting). 
54. Id. Other appraisals are less complimentary. See Ross & Swetlitz, supra note 47 
(quoting a doctor from Jupiter Florida hospital describing the product as “a piece of s—”). 
55. See infra Section IV.A. 
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jor hospitals, to medium-resource contexts like community hospitals 
or community health centers, to low-resource contexts like rural pro-
viders in less-developed countries. The higher-resource the destina-
tion context, the easier the translation — but the smaller the potential 
for transforming medical care. 
The most straightforward translation is from the absolute top-
notch, very high-resource hospitals to other slightly-less-high-
resource hospitals — taking the expertise of Memorial Sloan Ketter-
ing’s cancer center, for instance, and making it accessible to smaller 
hospitals with less specialized or less experienced oncologists. IBM is 
already doing this; it’s the easiest path, because those settings already 
have the basic resources and infrastructure in place. The information 
technology is in place, and oncologists are already on hand who can 
take AI recommendations and use them to change — ideally to im-
prove — their own practice (or reject them, as the case may be).56 
This is democratization of expertise on a small scale; very valuable, 
but perhaps not transformative. But this is not the only potential con-
text. 
Close to the other end of the spectrum, medical AI could be de-
ployed to genuinely low-resource contexts: small rural hospitals, 
community health centers or clinics, solo practitioners’ offices or 
small doctors’ practices. Where specialists are unavailable — to say 
nothing of highly skilled, experienced specialists — medical AI could 
make a tremendous difference in the type and level of care that could 
be offered. IDx-DR provides exactly this sort of potential: in places 
without available ophthalmologists, the AI/camera combination al-
lows providers to check patients with diabetes for diabetic retinopa-
thy, availing themselves of ophthalmologic expertise through the AI 
system.57 Deploying AI in these contexts demands resources, but al-
most certainly far fewer resources than improving care by training and 
employing new medical specialists. 
AI could truly transform care in the lowest-resource contexts. In 
Liberia, as of 2016, there were 298 doctors for a population of 4.5 
million, including only fifteen pediatricians and six ophthalmolo-
gists.58 In rural India, a single doctor can be responsible for as many 
                                                                                                    
56. See supra note 51 (noting that some Thai oncologists rejected Watson Oncology rec-
ommendations based on local preferences); see also Ross & Swetlitz, supra note 47 (noting 
that some Watson Oncology recommendations, based on Memorial Sloan Kettering prac-
tice, differed from national guidelines); infra Section VI.A (noting difficulties with using 
human-in-the-loop safeguards for medical AI generally). 
57. See discussion supra Section II.C.1. 
58. Al-Varney Rogers, Liberian Doctors Threaten Go-Slow over Salary Arrears, FRONT 
PAGE AFR. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://frontpageafricaonline.com/health/liberian-doctors-
threaten-go-slow-over-salary-arrears [https://perma.cc/MGA3-LLCG] (citing a July 2016 
report by the Liberia Medical and Dental Council). 
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as 30,000 residents in the rural health system.59 In such low-resource 
environments, medical AI could provide front-line access for simple 
diagnostics and treatment recommendations, triaging patients who 
need to seek further help, as well as the more complex tasks that AI 
can facilitate in higher-resource contexts. In India, where the doctor 
shortage extends to ophthalmologists, the Google AI team is already 
deploying its own AI system to diagnose diabetic retinopathy for pa-
tients who cannot access ophthalmologists for recommended yearly 
screenings.60 Further work has suggested that smartphones may be 
suitable for such machine-learning diagnoses, which could lower the 
barriers to AI-mediated care even further.61 Overall, while AI has the 
potential to incrementally improve care in relatively high-resource 
settings, it could revolutionize care in very low-resource contexts. 
 
* * * 
 
Medical AI can make a difference in many areas of medicine, but 
one of the most exciting is democratizing medical expertise, especial-
ly by bringing diagnostic and treatment recommendation expertise to 
lower-resource settings where they are otherwise unavailable. The 
next Part explores the first part of that process: developing algorithms 
that incorporate medical expertise. 
III. WHERE MEDICAL AI IS DEVELOPED — AND WHY 
Black-box medical algorithms are predominantly developed in 
partnership with high-resource medical settings. These are often aca-
demic medical systems, but I also include high-resource standalone 
hospitals. I’ll refer to the group collectively as “High-Resource Hospi-
tals.” In a typical arrangement, the AI system developer partners with 
the High-Resource Hospital with an agreement to use the High-
Resource Hospital’s data to train and develop a new medical algo-
rithm. In the examples above, IBM’s Watson Oncology partners with 
                                                                                                    
59. Devarsetty Praveen et al., SMARTHealth India: Development and Field Evaluation of 
a Mobile Clinical Decision Support System for Cardiovascular Diseases in Rural India, 2 
JMIR MHEALTH & UHEALTH, Oct.–Dec. 2014, at e54, https://mhealth.jmir.org/2014/4/e54/ 
pdf [https://perma.cc/73M5-2RV4]. 
60. Kamala Thiagarajan, The AI Program That Can Tell Whether You May Go Blind, 
GUARDIAN: THE UPSIDE (Feb. 8, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2019/feb/08/the-ai-program-that-can-tell-whether-you-are-going-blind-algorithm-eye-
disease-india-diabetes [https://perma.cc/Y6AY-CW2X]; see also Varun Gulshan et al., 
Development and Validation of a Deep Learning Algorithm for Detection of Diabetic Reti-
nopathy in Retinal Fundus Photographs, 316 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2402, 2402 (2016) (de-
scribing an AI diagnostic system). 
61. Ramachandran Rajalakshmi et al., Automated Diabetic Retinopathy Detection in 
Smartphone-Based Fundus Photography Using Artificial Intelligence, 32 EYE 1138, 1138 
(2018). 
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Memorial Sloan Kettering62 and EyeDiagnosis partners with the Uni-
versity of Iowa Health System and the University of Arizona.63 At the 
academic/pre-development level, similar patterns manifest: over 500 
medical AI studies have been based on the MIMIC dataset, the most-
used publicly available health dataset for AI — which includes data 
only from patients seen at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, a 
high-resource Harvard-affiliated hospital in Boston.64 
Developer focus on High-Resource Hospitals does not reflect the 
delivery of medical care, either nationally or worldwide. Academic 
medical centers, for instance, make up only a small fraction of all 
hospitals, and deliver a small (though larger) fraction of care.65 Many 
more medical encounters take place in practitioner offices, community 
health centers, or community hospitals than in High-Resource Hospi-
tals of various flavors. 
Algorithm developers partner with High-Resource Hospitals for a 
varying combination of technical, legal, and business reasons.66 First 
and most importantly, High-Resource Hospitals are more likely to 
have large, high-quality data sets. Second, training algorithms on data 
from High-Resource Hospitals may facilitate convincing potential 
clients or insurers that the algorithm is high-quality and worth paying 
for. Third, training algorithms on High-Resource Hospital data de-
creases the risk of adverse outcomes from three legal processes: re-
ceiving regulatory approval, avoiding tort liability for potential 
problems once the algorithm is in use, and winning reimbursement 
from payers. 
                                                                                                    
62. Memorial Sloan Kettering Trains IBM Watson to Help Doctors Make Better Cancer 
Treatment Choices, MEMORIAL SLOAN KETTERING CANCER CTR. (Apr. 11, 2014), 
https://www.mskcc.org/blog/msk-trains-ibm-watson-help-doctors-make-better-treatment-
choices [https://perma.cc/HB8U-36VT]. 
63. Pipeline, IDX, https://www.eyediagnosis.net/pipeline [https://perma.cc/L5W4-S2UZ].  
64. Rebecca Robbins, How Patient Records from One Boston Hospital Fueled an Explo-
sion in AI Research in Medicine, STAT (July 12, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/ 
07/12/boston-hospital-records-fuel-artificial-intelligence-research [https://perma.cc/YGF6-
AKWZ]. 
65. See, e.g., Joanna Bisgaier et al., Academic Medical Centers and Equity in Specialty 
Care Access for Children, 166 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 304, 304 
(2012) (observing that academic medical centers were “only 6% of the nation’s hospitals 
[yet] provide 28% of all discharges of Medicaid enrollees”); Academic Medical Centers: 
Shaping the Future of Healthcare, UCI HEALTH (June 23, 2016), http://www.ucihealth.org/ 
news/2016/06/academic-medical-centers-future-of-healthcare [https://perma.cc/F89N-
BY65] (noting that “[a]cademic medical centers make up 2 to 2.5 percent of all hospitals in 
the country”). 
66. I do not claim that all of these reasons apply in each case, and they may be of varying 
strength; one anonymous industry insider, for instance, described data availability as a 
“need to have” and potential easing of FDA review as “nice to have.” 
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A. That’s Where the Data Are 
The first reason for developer focus on High-Resource Hospitals 
is fundamental: High-Resource Hospitals have more data. Indeed, 
they may be the only places that actually have high-volume, high-
quality data. To take one simple example: health data are hard to use 
or access unless they are in electronic format. In health care settings, 
that typically means that the data are recorded in an electronic health 
record.67 By now, electronic health records are almost universal; by 
2017, essentially all hospitals had adopted electronic health records 
systems, as had about 90% of office-based practices.68 However, if a 
developer wants longitudinal data, or the ability to track results over 
time, adoption one or two years ago is insufficient — and in 2008, 
only about 10% of hospitals had EHR systems in place.69 Which hos-
pitals were those? High-Resource Hospitals.70 
The mere presence of electronic health records is not enough. For 
a health-care provider to collect data that can be used to develop med-
ical AI, the provider needs the right infrastructure.71 This includes 
developing (1) systems so that providers input the right data, in the 
right format; (2) databases to ensure that data are collected, catego-
rized, and made available for future use; and (3) quality checks to en-
sure that the data collected are correct.72 This infrastructure can be 
                                                                                                    
67. Other health data that can be used for training medical AI include pharmacy records 
or insurance claims data — or non-medical data such as internet search histories or personal 
health trackers. See generally SHARONA HOFFMAN, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS AND 
MEDICAL BIG DATA: LAW AND POLICY (2016). These, too, need to be in electronic format. 
However, electronic health records are the most direct source of data about health-care 
encounters in particular. Id. at 9. 
68. Vindell Washington et al., The HITECH Era and the Path Forward, 377 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 904, 904–05 (2017). Electronic health record adoption received a substantial push in 
the HITECH Act, which largely mandated their adoption. See What is the HITECH Act?, 
HIPAA J., https://www.hipaajournal.com/what-is-the-hitech-act [https://perma.cc/8W63-
5BJ2]. 
69. Washington et al., supra note 68, at 905 (showing data for nonfederal acute care hos-
pitals). Older, paper-based records may be digitized by scanning, but such data migration 
creates a complicated hybrid system. See, e.g., Diane Dolezel & Jackie Moczygemba, Im-
plementing EHRs: An Exploratory Study to Examine Current Practices in Migrating Physi-
cian Practice, 12 PERSP. HEALTH INFO. MGMT., Winter 2015, at 1e, 1e, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4700870/pdf/phim0012-0001e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/39DX-RP7D]. Eventually, this problem will lessen as even new EHR 
systems acquire longitudinal data over time — but that will take substantial time, by defini-
tion, and if developers are to take advantage of that eventual broadening, policymakers must 
ensure that the current system is not locked in as the default, legal and otherwise.  
70. See, e.g., John D. Halamka et al., Early Experiences with Personal Health Records, 
15 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 1, 1 (2008) (describing early EHR systems at the Palo 
Alto Medical Foundation, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, and Boston Children’s 
Hospital). 
71. Price, Big Data, supra note 30, at 1413. 
72. Id. at 1411–15; see also Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, The Use and Misuse of 
Biomedical Data: Is Bigger Really Better?, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 497, 515–20 (2013) (de-
scribing pitfalls and precautions for biomedical database development). 
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complex, challenging, and expensive.73 It demands information tech-
nology resources, data scientists or data managers (themselves in 
short supply), and attention from management.74 These requirements 
are a priori harder to meet for low-resource health-care providers than 
for High-Resource Hospitals — they have fewer resources, by defini-
tion — skewing the distribution of health-record data to the latter con-
text. 
Law also creates hurdles to the collection and use of big health 
data for research purposes, especially through the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act’s75 Privacy Rule (the HIPAA Pri-
vacy Rule) 76  and requirements for informed consent. 77  Under the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule, “covered entities” — including essentially all 
health-care providers and hospitals78 — are prohibited from using or 
disclosing individually identifiable health information without author-
ization, except for a list of specifically identified purposes.79 Research 
is not one of those specifically identified purposes.80 Providers wish-
ing to use patient data for research purposes must therefore either ob-
tain individual authorization81  (a closely prescribed and potentially 
sample-biasing process)82 or remove identifying information from the 
sample (which makes linking different data together difficult).83 
The requirement to obtain informed consent and research approv-
al for use of patient data similarly imposes costs on that use.84 In-
                                                                                                    
73. See Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 72; Price, Big Data, supra note 30, at 1411–
15. 
74. HOFFMAN, supra note 67, at 152–68; see also Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 72, 
at 527–32; Price, Big Data, supra note 30, at 1414–15. 
75. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
76. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 C.F.R. §§ 
160, 164 (2018). State privacy rules also come into play and further complicate the situa-
tion. See Barbara J. Evans, The Ethics of Postmarketing Observational Studies of Drug 
Safety Under 505(o)(3) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 577, 594 
(2012). 
77. See W. Nicholson Price II, Drug Approval in a Learning Health System, 102 MINN. 
L. REV. 2413, 2446–48 (2018) [hereinafter Price, Drug Approval]. 
78. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018). 
79. Id. § 164.502. 
80. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting Healthcare Innova-
tion on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 3, 35–36 (2017) (describing the lack of a 
research exemption, and noting that the “operations” and “quality improvement” exemp-
tions do not cover research). 
81. See Kayte Spector-Bagdady & Andrew G. Shuman, Reg-ent Within the Learning 
Health System, 158 OTOLARYNGOLOGY — HEAD & NECK SURGERY 405, 405 (2018). 
82. See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Balancing Privacy, Autonomy, and 
Scientific Needs in Electronic Health Records Research, 65 SMU L. REV. 85, 114–19 
(2012) (describing this bias). 
83. See Eisenberg & Price, supra note 80, at 36–37. 
84. See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 82, at 123 (describing empirical evidence 
on informed consent costs); Mark J. Pletcher et al., Informed Consent in Randomized Quali-
ty Improvement Trials: A Critical Barrier for Learning Health Systems, 174 JAMA 
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formed consent requirements are part of a suite of oversight and ethi-
cal requirements,85 typically enforced by institutional review boards 
that review research.86 Obtaining informed consent for research use of 
patient data can be an arduous and costly process.87 
These legal hurdles tend to concentrate the collection and use of 
patient health data for research purposes in High-Resource Hospitals. 
The hurdles may be justified — though that claim has been ques-
tioned88 — and certainly were put in place to serve laudable aims.89 
Nevertheless, the costs imposed by these legal hurdles weigh especial-
ly heavily in low-resource contexts, like small hospitals, community 
health centers, or solo practitioners in rural areas, which have fewer 
resources to start with. Even de-identifying patient data to comply 
with the HIPAA Privacy Rule and informed consent requirements 
may impose its own costs.90 Those low-resource settings are unlikely 
to have the resources to spend on addressing legal compliance issues, 
just as they are unlikely to have spare resources to meet the techno-
logical requirements for a useful data infrastructure that can support 
future research.91 These resource constraints help drive the concentra-
tion of medical big data — and the concomitant ability to develop 
black-box medical algorithms — in high-resource contexts. 
B. Reputational Effects 
Reputational effects also push algorithm developers to partner 
with High-Resource Hospitals. Developers of black-box medical algo-
rithms must persuade potential clients that these algorithms will pro-
vide excellent results, whether diagnoses or treatment 
                                                                                                    
INTERNAL MED. 668, 668 (2014) (describing how informed consent requirements make 
large-scale clinical trials and data collection more challenging). 
85. See, e.g., Ruth R. Faden et al., Informed Consent, Comparative Effectiveness, and 
Learning Health Care, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 766, 768 (2014). 
86. See Price, Drug Approval, supra note 77, at 2446 n.208. 
87. See id. at 2457; Charlotte A. Tschider, The Consent Myth: Improving Choice for Pa-
tients of the Future, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1505, 1507 (2019) (finding HIPAA’s informed 
consent process largely incompatible with health AI). 
88. See, e.g., Price, Drug Approval, supra note 77, at 2449–52. See generally CARL E. 
SCHNEIDER, THE CENSOR’S HAND (2015) (critiquing research oversight by institutional 
review boards, including the procedural requirements of informed consent). 
89. See, e.g., Nancy E. Kass et al., The Research-Treatment Distinction: A Problematic 
Approach for Determining Which Activities Should Have Ethical Oversight, 43 HASTINGS 
CTR. REP., S4, S5 (Jan.–Feb. 2013). 
90. See, e.g., Elizabeth Ford et al., Extracting Information from the Text of Electronic 
Medical Records to Improve Case Detection: A Systematic Review, J. AM. MED. 
INFORMATICS ASS’N 1007, 1013 (2016). 
91. Interview with Researcher, Univ. of Mich. (Feb. 2018) (describing the process of de-
veloping a learning health system at a low-resource Michigan health system); Interview 
with Medical AI Researcher, Vanderbilt Univ. (July 2018). 
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recommendations.92 Making that pitch is likely easier when the devel-
oper can state that the algorithm is trained on data from presumably 
expert doctors at High-Resource Hospitals, rather than a more run-of-
the-mill medical practice.93 IBM, for instance, notes that “Watson for 
Oncology can provide clinicians with evidence-based treatment op-
tions based on expert training by Memorial Sloan Kettering (MSK) 
physicians.”94 
C. Legal Influences 
Finally, three legal regimes also suggest the utility of training al-
gorithms with data from practitioners at the top of their profession: 
FDA approval, tort liability, and insurer reimbursement. In no case 
does the legal regime require high-resource context training, but in 
each case risk-averse developers may find that such training decreases 
the possibility of unexpected problems. 
1. FDA Approval 
Many forms of medical AI will require FDA approval to be mar-
keted. The FDA regulates “medical devices” under the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetics Act and defines “device” quite broadly so that 
many forms of medical AI will qualify.95 The FDA has released guid-
ance on regulating Software as a Medical Device (“SaMD”) general-
ly96 and has also released guidance on regulation of clinical decision 
support software under the 21st Century Cures Act (“Cures Act”).97 
Both suggest that FDA will regulate medical AI.98 And indeed, a few 
                                                                                                    
92. See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 2, at 465–66. Empirical studies on the 
challenge of provider adoption present an interesting avenue for future work. To my 
knowledge, none yet exist. 
93. Interview with Lawyer for a Major Medical AI Developer (May 2018). 
94. IBM Watson Health, supra note 46; see supra Section II.C.1.b. 
95. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012). 
96. See FDA, SOFTWARE AS A MEDICAL DEVICE (SAMD): CLINICAL EVALUATION — 




97 . See FDA, CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT SOFTWARE: DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR 
INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2019), https://www.fda.gov/ 
regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/clinical-decision-support-software 
[https://perma.cc/GP6D-CXEY]; 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 
1033, 1130–33 (2016) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 360j (2012)). 
98. See W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 
439–42 (2017). Under the 21st Century Cures Act, many forms of clinical decision support 
software are excluded from the definition of medical devices. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. 
L. No 114-255, 130 Stat. at 1130–33 (2016). That is, software that merely informs doctors 
of treatment options or that makes recommendations may not be regulated as a medical 
device — but only if the software provides an explanation of its recommendations and al-
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devices using medical AI have already been allowed on the market by 
FDA, including one product that uses machine learning to estimate 
cardiac volume;99 one product that identifies radiological images of 
breast abnormalities for further review;100 and one product, the IDx-
DR mentioned above, that analyzes retinal images to autonomously 
diagnose diabetic retinopathy.101 Many more medical AI devices are 
likely to come through FDA’s approval or clearance pathways.102 
Training medical AI with high-quality data from high-resource 
contexts may ease the path to FDA approval. The FDA does not yet 
have any explicit standards or rules about the quality or source of data 
used in training medical AI.103 In a sense, the agency is learning as it 
goes along in this area of very new technology.104 Nevertheless, all 
                                                                                                    
lows the provider “to independently review the basis for such recommendations . . . so that 
it is not the intent that such [providers] rely primarily on any of such recommendations to 
make a clinical diagnosis or treatment decision regarding an individual patient.” 21st Centu-
ry Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. at 1131 (2016). Medical AI — at least the type 
of medical diagnosis and treatment AI discussed here — will rarely meet this description 
because it will typically be unable to provide reasoning sufficient for independent review. 
See Price, supra, at 440. This will not be the case for all medical AI; some systems at least 
make claims to explain the reasoning behind their decisions, though this is a contested area 
and there may be tradeoffs between algorithmic performance and explainability require-
ments. Other types of AI are not medical devices because they do not inform or direct the 
care of individual patients; AI used in billing, or to provide medical literature references to 
doctors, would be excluded. See, e.g., 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 
Stat. at 1131 (2016). Nevertheless, as described below, even when FDA approval is not 
required, such as for devices with sufficient explainability to sit within § 3060’s exemption, 
FDA approval brings other benefits. See infra Section III.C.3.  
99. Letter from FDA to Arterys, Inc. (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ 
cdrh_docs/pdf16/K163253.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6M4-6QQH] (determining that the Arter-
ys Cardio DL system is substantially equivalent to legally marketed predicate devices). 
100 . Letter from FDA to Quantitative Insights, Inc. (July 19, 
2017), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf17/DEN170022.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UX5U-T2X5] (classifying QuantX as a Class II medical device under the 
de novo pathway). 
101. Press Release, FDA, FDA Permits Marketing of Artificial Intelligence-Based De-
vice to Detect Certain Diabetes-Related Eye Problems (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm604357.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5K8X-JMBU]. 
102. The extent to which FDA will evaluate AI medical devices as components of a larg-
er system or holistically is also unclear. See Tschider, supra note 20, at 207 (describing 
limitations of classifying health-care AI systems as components when they may be used for 
differing diagnostic purposes). 
103. Interview with Senior FDA Official (June 2018). 
104. Interviews with Regulatory Affairs Personnel at Medical AI Developers (May and 
June 2018); see FDA, Challenge Questions, https://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/DigitalHealthPreCertProgram/UCM605686.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SA26-5BWV]; FDA, Digital Health Software Precertification (Pre-Cert) 
Program, https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/digitalhealth/digitalhealthprecertprogram/ 
default.htm [https://perma.cc/AB4S-5VST]. 
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things being equal, training algorithms on the highest quality data 
available removes at least one cause for risk and uncertainty.105  
2. Tort Liability 
The tort regime also creates incentives for medical AI develop-
ment.106 The tort landscape for medical AI is largely theoretical, as the 
technology is just entering practice. Even the limited scholarly work 
on the topic has focused more on medical malpractice liability of pro-
viders using medical AI, rather than on liability for the developers of 
the AI products.107 If a patient is injured through the failure of medical 
AI, however, liability could be found for developers on theories of 
negligence or strict liability, alleging design or manufacturing de-
fect.108 Successful tort claims against a medical AI developer face 
numerous challenges, including identifying the injury, demonstrating 
causation within the context of opaque recommendations, overcoming 
the reluctance of courts to find liability for software generally,109 and 
avoiding the doctrine of the learned intermediary.110 But there is still a 
risk of liability. 
High-quality data from high-resource settings could serve as po-
tential insulation from possible tort liability. It is not clear whether 
design defect or manufacturing defect would more accurately encap-
sulate a failure to train an algorithm correctly. But training algorithms 
on data from excellent doctors in high-resource settings creates an 
easier case that the developer exercised due care in the development 
process. To the extent that developing algorithms based on high-
                                                                                                    
105. All things may not be equal. For instance, if a lower-resource setting also provides 
lower-quality care (not a certainty), then an AI system could more easily show a greater 
effect in the lower-resource setting. 
106. Tort law shapes other aspects of the development of black-box medicine. See, e.g., 
W. Nicholson Price II, Medical Malpractice and Black-Box Medicine, in BIG DATA, 
HEALTH LAW, AND BIOETHICS 295, 295–96 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter 
Price, Medical Malpractice]; Froomkin et al., supra note 49, at 35. Among other aspects, to 
the extent that tort law relies on demonstrating causation, and to the extent that demonstrat-
ing causation is hampered by essentially opaque machine-learning algorithms, we might 
expect that tort law pushes medical AI away from explainability and reliance on explicit 
factors, and toward models that are harder to interrogate — and therefore harder landscapes 
to pinpoint causation. 
107. See, e.g., Froomkin et al., supra note 49, at 55; Price, Medical Malpractice, supra 
note 106, at 295; Nicolas P. Terry & Lindsay F. Wiley, Liability for Mobile Health and 
Wearable Technologies, 25 ANNALS HEALTH L. 62, 81 (2016). 
108. Cf. Daniel A. Crane, et al., A Survey of Legal Issues Arising from the Development 
of Autonomous and Connected Vehicles, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 261 
(2017) (discussing potential products liability claims against software providers in the event 
of an autonomous vehicle crash). 
109. Cf. Frances E. Zollers et al., No More Soft Landings for Software: Liability for De-
fects in an Industry that Has Come of Age, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
745, 766 (2004). 
110. See Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule for the New 
Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 193, 195 (2004). 
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resource data becomes standard practice, failure to do so — if injuries 
result — could potentially be viewed as a failure to exercise due care 
in development.111 
Although tort law seems unlikely to be a principal source of in-
centives to develop algorithms on high-resource data, it likely rein-
forces existing pressures in that direction. 
3. Insurer Reimbursement 
Finally, convincing insurers that these new technologies should 
be reimbursed could easily follow a similar pattern.112 Training algo-
rithms on the data from highly skilled doctors is at least a proxy signal 
of quality. All things being equal, it suggests that the algorithms are 
likely to be higher quality, and therefore worthier of reimbursement. 
While the source of the training data is unlikely completely to replace 
other quality metrics (e.g., patient outcomes, decreased costs), linking 
an algorithm to the reputation of its training data may supplement 
those metrics on the path to reimbursement by payers.113 
 
* * * 
 
These issues are not totally distinct. The link between FDA ap-
proval and reimbursement by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (“CMS”), the largest payer in the United States, is substantial 
for drugs, though less so for medical devices in general.114 However, 
the link is prominent in the development of new diagnostic tests, in-
cluding those reliant on big data.115  Foundation Medicine pursued 
FDA approval of its Foundation One biomarker test simultaneously 
with CMS review for payment in a prominent example of joint FDA 
approval/CMS coverage determination. 116  CMS suggested that the 
                                                                                                    
111. See Froomkin et al., supra note 49, at 36–37, 49 (arguing that as medical AI im-
proves, it will become standard of care to use it and a failure to do so might result in liabil-
ity). 
112. See, e.g., Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Inno-
vation Incentive, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 178–79 (2016) (describing insurance reim-
bursement process); cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Harold Varmus, Insurance for Broad 
Genomic Tests in Oncology, 358 SCI. 1133, 1133 (2017) (describing the practice of insurers 
declining to cover new next-generation sequencing techniques because of lack of clinical 
evidence). 
113. See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 2, at 462–64 (discussing reimbursement 
challenges for black-box medicine). 
114. See Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2307, 2309, 
2311, 2342 (2018). 
115. See Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of Person-
alized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881, 1885 (2016). 
116. See Eisenberg & Varmus, supra note 112, at 1134; Press Release, FDA, FDA An-
nounces Approval, CMS Proposes Coverage of First Breakthrough-Designated Test to 
Detect Extensive Number of Cancer Biomarkers (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/ 
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level of reimbursement available for such next-generation diagnostics 
would be linked to the type of FDA review sought.117 Devices taken 
through FDA’s more stringent Class III approval pathway would re-
ceive full reimbursement, while devices that were only “cleared” 
through FDA’s less-stringent 510(k) clearance pathway would receive 
lower reimbursement rates.118 This stringent difference did not make 
it into final policy.119 
FDA approval is also linked to tort liability. State tort lawsuits al-
leging negligent design of medical devices are preempted if the device 
was approved by FDA through the premarket approval process (but 
not if the device was cleared under the 510(k) pathway).120 Thus, to 
the extent that the FDA approval pathway is smoothed by the demon-
stration of high-quality data reliance, that also has indirect impacts on 
the ease of obtaining reimbursement for the product and on reducing 
tort liability. 
D. Caveats 
The reliance on medical data from High-Resource Hospitals is 
both over-determined and under-determined. In many situations, firms 
will rely on High-Resource Hospital data for multiple reasons, any 
combination of which may be independently sufficient. By contrast, in 
two notable exceptions, algorithms may be trained on data from dif-
ferent sources. 
First, some types of medical data are so highly standardized that 
the particular setting from which they arise does not matter very 
much. For instance, because ophthalmological examinations are high-
ly standardized, the field has developed gold-standards for images and 
                                                                                                    
news-events/press-announcements/fda-announces-approval-cms-proposes-coverage-first-
breakthrough-designated-test-detect-extensive [https://perma.cc/ZBL2-A7SM]. 
117. See CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., PROPOSED DECISION MEMO FOR NEXT 
GENERATION SEQUENCING (NGS) FOR MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES WITH ADVANCED 
CANCER (CAG-00450N) (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-
database/details/nca-proposed-decision-memo.aspx?NCAId=290 [https://perma.cc/LP8R-
PVFS]; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Opting into Device Regulation in the Face of Uncertain 
Patentability, MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. (forthcoming) (draft on file with author) [here-
inafter Eisenberg, Device Regulation]. 
118. See Eisenberg, Device Regulation, supra note 117, at 20–21; Price, Regulating 
Black-Box Medicine, supra note 98, at 438 (describing the approval and clearance path-
ways). 
119. See CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DECISION MEMO FOR NEXT 
GENERATION SEQUENCING (NGS) FOR MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES WITH ADVANCED 
CANCER (CAG-00450N) (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-
database/details/nca-decision-memo.aspx?NCAId=290 [https://perma.cc/WB86-AXWW]. 
120. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323, 326–27 (2008) (finding preemp-
tion for devices that underwent premarket approval); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 
496–98 (1996) (finding no preemption for devices cleared through 510(k)). 
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diagnoses for use in training ophthalmologists, and these data can 
similarly be used to train medical AI.121 
Second, the picture changes drastically in an international con-
text. The particular patterns of health data acquisition, storage, and 
use — especially legal, but also technical — are artifacts of the pecu-
liar American health system. For instance, when the federal govern-
ment mandated that hospitals and other providers adopt EHRs, it left 
the choice of system to the market.122 As a result, different providers 
and hospitals use different EHR systems, which makes it hard to as-
semble data from different medical environments.123  In China and 
some other international contexts, on the other hand, the central gov-
ernment mandates specific EHRs and their adoption, and data collec-
tion is thus more widespread and uniform across different medical 
contexts, though those contexts may bring other challenges.124 Algo-
rithms trained on foreign data, then, may be less likely to rely on data 
from High-Resource Hospitals.125 
On the other hand, reliance on U.S. data from High-Resource 
Hospitals may be over-determined in some cases. The concentration 
of those data at High-Resource Hospitals may be a sufficient condi-
tion to drive company reliance on High-Resource Hospital data, be-
cause without those data, there is nothing on which to train the 
algorithms. However, the other factors mentioned — reputation and 
avoidance of legal risks — might themselves be independently suffi-
cient were the data to become available from more contexts.126 This 
matters because if use of data from High-Resource Hospitals is indeed 
over-determined for a subset of algorithm developers, then fixing 
merely one problem — availability of data or a broader path to FDA 
                                                                                                    
121 . See WISCONSIN FUNDUS PHOTOGRAPH READING 
CENTER, https://www.ophth.wisc.edu/research/fprc [https://perma.cc/S8W3-RF88]. 
122. See HOFFMAN, supra note 67, at 1–2. 
123. See Price, Risk and Resilience, supra note 32, at 70. 
124. See, e.g., Luxia Zhang et al., Big Data and Medical Research in China, 360 BMJ, 
Feb. 5, 2018, at 1–2. Of course, there may be other concerns with centrally-mandated EHR; 
for instance, although the United Kingdom developed a plan to centralize health data for 
biomedical research, that process was halted amid intense controversy. See Siobhan Fenton, 
Controversial Mega-database of Medical Records Scrapped Over Privacy Concerns, 
INDEPENDENT (July 6, 2016), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/ 
health-news/nhs-database-medical-records-care-data-scrapped-privacy-concerns-chilcot-
report-a7123126.html [https://perma.cc/7FAR-33V9]. 
125. See, e.g., Kasumi Widner & Sunny Virmani, New Milestones in Helping Prevent 
Eye Disease with Verily, GOOGLE (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.blog.google/technology/ 
health/new-milestones-helping-prevent-eye-disease-verily [https://perma.cc/5BCK-7XU9] 
(describing Google working with data from a chain of Indian eye hospitals). But see Corinne 
Abrams, Google’s Effort to Prevent Blindness Shows AI Challenges; Company’s AI Can 
Detect a Condition That Causes Blindness in Diabetes Patients, But in Rural India It 
Doesn’t Always Work, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/googles-
effort-to-prevent-blindness-hits-roadblock-11548504004 [https://perma.cc/V3GU-WZDJ] 
(describing challenges using Google’s algorithms in field clinics). 
126. See supra Sections III.B–C. 
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approval, for instance — will not actually result in medical AI being 
trained on data from different contexts. Instead, solving just part of 
the problem may result in developers continuing to train principally 
on data from High-Resource Hospitals. 
But what is the impact of training medical AI on data from High-
Resource Hospitals? The reasons listed above all seem reasonable 
justifications for training algorithms on those data. What’s the prob-
lem? The next Part explores the challenges that arise in translating 
algorithms trained on data from High-Resource Hospitals into less-
elite health-care settings. 
IV. TRANSLATIONAL CHALLENGES 
The promise of black-box medicine — at least, the promise that is 
the focus of this work — is that it can help democratize medical ex-
pertise, raising the level of run-of-the-mill practitioners and improving 
medical care. Achieving those goals requires that algorithms actually 
be deployed in those run-of-the-mill settings. How will algorithms 
trained on data from High-Resource Hospitals fare outside those set-
tings? This Part argues that problems are likely to arise in translation 
in two principal areas: quality of care and cost of care. 
One preliminary note: other technical challenges arise in the pro-
cess of translation itself, which are not the focus of this Part. For ex-
ample, it can be difficult to ensure that algorithms trained on data 
from one electronic health record system can accurately analyze data 
within the context of another electronic health record system.127 One 
study found that an algorithm developed in Washington state to iden-
tify lung cancer patients who would likely respond to targeted therapy 
performed well in Washington, but quite poorly in Kentucky, based in 
part on different language used in electronic health records.128 Such 
technical issues may be particularly likely when the deployment con-
text is relatively under-resourced; community health centers may be 
ill-equipped to deal with EHR incompatibility issues, for instance. 
Nevertheless, even if these more straightforward technical hurdles are 
overcome, less visible challenges of decreased patient care quality and 
increased cost may remain.129 
                                                                                                    
127. See Price, Risk and Resilience, supra note 32, at 71. 
128. See Bernardo Haddock Lobo Goulart et al., Validity of Natural Language Pro-
cessing for Ascertainment of EGFR and ALK Test Results in SEER Cases of Stage IV Non-
Small-Cell Lung Cancer, JCO CLINICAL CANCER INFORMATICS 1, 7 (2019). 
129. In fact, overcoming technical challenges may give a false sense of security, thus ob-
scuring the other problems that arise in translation. 
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A. Treatment Quality 
The most significant problem with applying algorithms developed 
in High-Resource Hospitals in lower-resource settings is that those 
algorithms are likely to make diagnoses and treatment recommenda-
tions that are systematically suboptimal in those lower-resource set-
tings. These can arise in at least two different ways: differences in 
diagnoses and treatment recommendations based on systematically 
different patient populations, and differences in recommended treat-
ments based on treatment rankings whose order shifts with available 
medical resources. This distinction is a bit abstract, so the next sec-
tions will illustrate with examples from current care and then describe 
how these examples could become embedded in relatively opaque 
black-box algorithms and negatively impact the quality of care. 
1. Patient Population Differences 
Algorithmic translation can cause problems in care when there are 
systematic differences between the patient populations used to train 
the algorithm and those where the algorithm is later used. If the pa-
tients in the training data — the High-Resource Hospital — differ 
systematically from the patients in low-resource settings where the 
algorithm is deployed as part of an AI system, the system won’t do a 
good job dealing with those patients. 
Patient population differences, including ancestral origin/genetic 
variation, socioeconomic status,130 or general health status,131 can in-
fluence recommendations for treatment in many ways. These differ-
ences can influence both proper diagnosis and proper treatment. 
Consider two examples, one on the prediction side and one on the 
treatment side. 
A prominent example on the diagnosis/prophylactic front comes 
from hypertrophic cardiomyopathy.132 In this condition, the wall of 
the heart thickens abnormally, potentially leading to abnormal 
rhythms and even sudden death; it is particularly dangerous for young 
athletes who can be asymptomatic and then die during strenuous exer-
                                                                                                    
130. See, e.g., Dhruv Khullar, A.I. Could Worsen Health Disparities, N.Y. TIMES  
(Jan. 31 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/31/opinion/ai-bias-healthcare.html 
[https://perma.cc/6QXJ-SQZS] (noting AI may entrench current inequities in health: “If, for 
example, poorer patients do worse after organ transplantation or after receiving chemother-
apy for end-stage cancer, machine-learning algorithms may conclude such patients are less 
likely to benefit from further treatment — and recommend against it.”). 
131. For instance, of all patients with a particular disease, those with the most severe 
symptoms might disproportionately choose to go to High-Resource Hospitals, which would 
skew the data from which an algorithm could learn. 
132. See Arjun K. Manrai et al., Genetic Misdiagnoses and the Potential for Health Dis-
parities, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 655, 655 (2016). 
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tion.133 Genetic tests are used to identify the disorder — but a 2016 
study found that black Americans were underrepresented in the initial 
data, and as a result many black patients were told they were at risk 
based on a mutation that does not in fact predict a higher risk for 
them.134 Medical AI could easily use this type of genetic information, 
especially once genetic sequencing becomes more common, to drive 
preliminary diagnoses and recommendations for further screening — 
and unless that medical AI was trained on more representative data, it 
would provide poor results for underrepresented groups.135 
On the treatment side, consider clopidogrel, marketed in the Unit-
ed States as Plavix for preventing heart attacks and stroke.136 The 
gene CYP2C19 is related to the efficacy of clopidogrel. One particular 
CYP2C19 allele reduces how well clopidogrel works — but only ap-
pears in those of European ancestry 10–20% of the time, as opposed 
to those of Pacific Islander descent (40–77%) or East Asian descent 
(23–45%).137 Unfortunately, 95% of participants in the initial clinical 
studies were of European descent — leading to the conclusion that the 
drug is much more broadly effective than it actually is.138 The state of 
Hawaii sued Bristol-Myers Squibb and Sanofi-Aventis, the makers of 
Plavix, for false, unfair, and deceptive marketing based on the failure 
to disclose that treatment efficacy differed based on patient popula-
tions.139 
Differences between patients are well-recognized. Those differ-
ences drive the development of precision medicine: the idea that med-
ical treatment should take into account the characteristics of each 
individual patient.140 For drugs, that means getting the right drug to 
the right patient, at the right time.141 For medicine to take those differ-
ences into account, though, especially AI, medical technologies need 
to be developed in environments that actually show representative 
variation. If, as posited here, certain types of variation are not reflect-
ed in development environments, those potential benefits are lost. 
That is to say, if High-Resource Hospitals have notably different pa-
                                                                                                    
133. See id. at 656. 
134. See id. at 659–60. 
135. See Lucia A. Hindorff, et al., Prioritizing Diversity in Human Genomics Research, 
19 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 175, 175 (2018) (“Increased attention to diversity will increase 
the accuracy, utility and acceptability of using genomic information for clinical care.”). 
136. See Alan H.B. Wu et al., The Hawaii Clopidogrel Lawsuit: The Possible Effect on 
Clinical Laboratory Testing, 12 PERSONALIZED MED. 179, 179 (2015). 
137. See id. at 180. 
138. See Rachel Huddart et al., Are Randomized Controlled Trials Necessary to Establish 
the Value of Implementing Pharmacogenomics in the Clinic?, 106 CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 284, 285 (2019). 
139. See Vence L. Bonham et al., Will Precision Medicine Move Us Beyond Race?, 374 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2003, 2004 (2016). 
140. See, e.g., Margaret A. Hamburg & Francis S. Collins, The Path to Personalized 
Medicine, 363 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 301, 301 (2010). 
141. See, e.g., id. 
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tient populations, then we should expect that medical AI trained on 
data from those populations and then deployed in different settings 
should encounter problems based on those patient population differ-
ences. 
And in fact, at least some High-Resource Hospitals show substan-
tially skewed patient populations. Roosa Tikkanen and her colleagues 
found that white patients were three times as likely as black patients 
to be admitted to academic medical centers in New York City in 2009, 
controlling for insurance status, age, and gender.142 Even after the 
Affordable Care Act went into effect, the ratio was still more than two 
to one.143 Thus, the data collected in those High-Resource Hospitals 
would substantially underrepresent black patients. This pattern is not 
universal among High-Resource Hospitals; Boston academic medical 
centers did not show the same underrepresentation as in New York.144 
Other studies have found similar results in terms of minority represen-
tation in academic medical centers.145 
Genomic data provide a useful example of the underrepresenta-
tion of diverse populations in big health data. To be sure, genomic 
data differ from electronic health records — EHRs are records of pa-
tient care that may be used for research, while genome sequences are 
frequently generated specifically for research purposes. Nevertheless, 
genomic data are key elements of big health data, especially those that 
push boundaries to increase the precision of medicine, and are im-
portant for medical AI. And genomic sequence databases are tremen-
dously non-representative. In 2009, 96% of participants in genome-
wide association studies were of European descent.146 More recently, 
the diversity of those databases has increased — but almost exclusive-
ly because of increased genomic sequencing efforts by Asian cen-
                                                                                                    
142. Roosa Sofia Tikkanen et al., Hospital Payer and Racial/Ethnic Mix at Private Aca-
demic Medical Centers in Boston and New York City, 47 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVS. 460, 464 
(2017). 
143. Id. 
144. See id. High-Resource Hospitals whose patient populations are more generally rep-
resentative will tend to produce algorithms with fewer translational problems — at least on 
the dimension of patient population differences. 
145. See, e.g., Neil S. Calman et al., Separate and Unequal Care in New York City, 9 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 105, 107 (2006); Romana Hasnain-Wynia et al., Disparities in 
Health Care Are Driven by Where Minority Patients Seek Care: Examination of the Hospi-
tal Quality Alliance Measures, 167 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1233, 1237–38 (2007); 
Ashish K. Jha et al., The Characteristics and Performance of Hospitals that Care for Elder-
ly Hispanic Americans, 27 HEALTH AFF. 528, 533–35 (2008). 
146. See Anna C. Need & David B. Goldstein, Next Generation Disparities in Human 
Genomics: Concerns and Remedies, 25 TRENDS GENETICS 489, 490 (2009). 
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ters.147 Patients of Latin-American and African descent remain rare in 
these databases.148 
More generally, researchers are increasingly realizing that the da-
ta used to train medical AI are not representative of the populations in 
which those AI may be used. Voice recognition AI often performs 
poorly when analyzing accented voices.149 And the databases of skin 
lesions used to train dermatological AI to recognize melanomas are 
largely missing images from patients with darker skin.150 
Overall, differences in patient populations may limit the generali-
zability of medical AI. Where AI is trained on data including only a 
limited and non-representative set of patients, it will work less well 
for patients outside that set. This problem has a familiar flavor; other 
forms of medical intervention, such as drugs, are also developed in 
particular patient contexts, and generalizability is an ongoing chal-
lenge.151 Some instances will matter more than others. It might be the 
case that retinal images look pretty much the same from any popula-
tion of patients in the world, so that contextual bias in retinal-image-
based diagnoses is a minimal concern — but skin images look very 
different depending on whether the skin is fair or not. The problem 
will vary, unsurprisingly, depending on the context. 
But a second set of translational challenges also exists, more de-
pendent on the pattern of medical AI’s development: challenges that 
arise from the differences in resource capacity between High-
Resource Hospitals and other settings where black-box medical algo-
rithms will be deployed. 
                                                                                                    
147. See Alice B. Popejoy & Stephanie M. Fullerton, Genomics Is Failing on Diversity, 
538 NATURE 161, 163 (2016). 
148. See id. at 162. All of Us, the NIH-led initiative to obtain health records and genomic 
sequences for more than a million Americans, is a notable effort to reflect patient diversity 
and is discussed in detail below. See infra Section VI.C. 
149. See Sonia Paul, Voice is the Next Big Platform, Unless You Have an Accent, WIRED, 
(March 20, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/voice-is-the-next-big-
platform-unless-you-have-an-accent [https://perma.cc/9TXN-RBXH] (“AI can only recog-
nize what it’s been trained to hear. Its flexibility depends on the diversity of the accents to 
which it’s been introduced.”); see also Will Knight, AI Programs are Learning to Exclude 
Some African-American Voices, MIT TECH. REV. (Aug. 16, 2017), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608619/ai-programs-are-learning-to-exclude-some-
african-american-voices [https://perma.cc/M53G-PLCF] (noting similar problems for both 
voice and text recognition). 
150. See Adewole S. Adamson & Avery Smith, Machine Learning and Health Care Dis-
parities in Dermatology, 154 JAMA DERMATOLOGY 1247, 1247 (2018). 
151. For a small sampling of the extensive literature on pharmacogenomics, a field based 
on this reality, see, for example, Mary V. Relling & William E. Evans, Pharmacogenomics 
in the Clinic, 526 NATURE 343 (2015), and Simona Volpi et al., Research Directions in the 
Clinical Implementation of Pharmacogenomics: An Overview of US Programs and Projects, 
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2. Resource Capacity Differences 
A second major source of contextual bias occurs because differ-
ences in resources change which option is better — that is, which 
treatment option an algorithm should recommend. This problem arises 
with treatment recommendations in a way that it doesn’t with diag-
nostic expertise. When medical AI gives a particular diagnosis, it 
simply provides that information, which is either accurate or not, 
whatever the situation. Whether a patient actually has a subdural he-
matoma does not depend on whether the patient presents at Mass 
General or in a rural Nigerian clinic. Whether AI gets that diagnosis 
right may change based on the contexts of training and application.152 
But the right diagnosis — the ground truth — does not change. 
Treatment recommendations are different, because they need to be put 
into practice — the provider and patient must actually undertake the 
treatment, and that process differs in different contexts.153 
Given a menu of treatment options for a given ailment, the “best” 
or most appropriate option in a high-resource setting may well be 
quite different than the best option in a low-resource setting. The most 
straightforward version of this dichotomy is when recommended 
treatment options are simply unavailable. In lower-resource settings, 
patients and providers may not have access to machines necessary for 
certain types of care (e.g., directed radiotherapy or laparoscopic sur-
gery) or certain drugs, either because they are too expensive or be-
cause they require specific conditions for transport and storage. In the 
very lowest-resource settings, drugs that require refrigeration may not 
be available if reliable cold-chain transport is absent. But these types 
of context disparities, while troubling, are at least easy to see; if AI 
says to do X, but X isn’t possible, that’s an easy recommendation to 
ignore. Algorithms with lots of those unhelpful recommendations 
won’t improve care very much in lower-resource contexts, but at least 
those algorithms won’t actively compromise care. 
More problematically, some treatments work very well when per-
formed by experts with excellent support structures, but poorly if per-
formed without those resources. Algorithms trained in high-resource 
settings may learn to prefer treatments that are only the best treat-
ments when performed in those same high-resource settings. When 
those algorithms are applied in lower-resource settings, lower-quality 
care may result, and that drop in quality may be tough to observe. 
Some examples may clarify the pattern. 
Gallbladder cancer and inflamed gallbladders demonstrate the 
tremendous difference in optimal choice based on the resources of the 
                                                                                                    
152. See supra Section IV.A.1. 
153. See supra Section II.C.2. 
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medical setting.154 Gallbladder cancer is both extremely rare and ex-
tremely aggressive; if it metastasizes beyond the gallbladder, patients 
have among the worse outcomes of any cancer. Cholecystitis, or in-
flammation of the gallbladder, on the other hand, is common. Chole-
cystitis is treated with a low-risk, technically straightforward surgery 
wherein the surgeon laparoscopically removes the inflamed gallblad-
der. Often, though, a patient will present to a doctor with what appears 
to be cholecystitis, but is actually gallbladder cancer. When that hap-
pens, the surgeon needs to notice — in the middle of the laparoscopic 
surgery — the signs of likely cancer and then decide — again, mid-
surgery — whether to try to remove the cancer or stop the surgery and 
send the patient to a higher-resource hospital.155 Doing the surgery 
(that is, removing the cancer and some surrounding tissue) 
requires significantly more surgeon skill, as well as 
surgeon education/understanding of the anatomy of 
the liver, the gallbladder, and the blood vessels and 
ducts. It also requires different, more specialized op-
erative instruments. It will take longer, and it can be 
much harder. But if it’s done correctly, the patient 
has their appropriate, necessary cancer operation at 
the time of (suspected) diagnoses. They may be 
cured at that point, or they might need chemo, but it 
gives them the best treatment and the best long-term 
survival. 
The problem with this option is that if there’s an er-
ror, the surgeon can seriously injure the liver itself, 
the blood vessels and ducts to/from the liver, or, 
much worse, tear the gallbladder and spill cancer 
throughout the abdomen. Any of those has severe 
consequences that will require significant resources 
to address (or . . . advance the cancer and kill the pa-
tient).156 
On the other hand, stopping the surgery and sending the patient to 
a better-trained surgeon with better equipment has essentially no risk 
(except the time elapsed), and no immediate benefit. Choosing to pur-
                                                                                                    
154. E-mail from Dr. Clare French, General Surgeon, SurgOne, P.C. (on file with au-
thor). 
155. Not noticing the cancer is itself highly problematic (and a situation where AI could 
help); if the surgeon does not notice the cancer, common techniques such as opening the 
gallbladder to drain it before removal could be disastrous, spilling cancer throughout the 
abdomen and dooming the patient to a rapid death. E-mail exchange with Dr. Clare French, 
supra note 154. 
156. Id. 
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sue the surgery may well be the right option in a setting with trained 
surgeons and better equipment — but is often a poor option in settings 
without those resources.157 AI helping make that choice could easily 
make the wrong choice if trained only in environments with highly 
skilled surgeons. 
Interventions do not have to be surgical. Choices among drugs 
may also be resource-dependent. Consider the example of a chemo-
therapeutic raised above: while a powerful drug may be most effica-
cious against a cancer, it may also carry high risks of serious side 
effects that require highly skilled monitoring to avoid. In a high-
resource setting, the stronger chemotherapeutic may be the right call; 
outside such a setting, it may be catastrophic. 
Overall, diagnostics and interventions that are the best options in 
high-resource settings will frequently not be the best options in low-
resource contexts. When black-box algorithms are trained exclusively 
in high-resource settings, we should expect them to perform worse in 
low-resource settings where both patient populations and available 
resources are different. 
B. Cost 
Training medical AI in High-Resource Hospitals may also bias 
the resulting algorithms toward selecting more costly procedures. 
High-Resource Hospitals are on the cutting edge of medical treatment; 
they are where the most sophisticated and up-to-date techniques and 
technologies are developed and used. Academic medical centers also 
tend to treat patients more intensively than do other medical set-
tings.158 These treatments are often excellent — some researchers find 
that academic medical centers do better by patients than other hospi-
tals159 — but they are also more expensive.160 
                                                                                                    
157. Nevertheless, surgeons in community hospitals certainly do sometimes think that at-
tempting to remove the gallbladder cancer on the spot is the right option, and make that 
choice — despite the higher risk and potential failure. Id. 
158. See, e.g., Teryl Nuckols et al., What Value-Based Payment Means for Academic 
Medical Centers, NEJM CATALYST (May 30, 2019), https://catalyst.nejm.org/value-based-
payment-academic-medical-centers [https://perma.cc/J8G4-T39Z]. 
159. See, e.g., Laura G. Burke et al., Association Between Teaching Status and Mortality 
in US Hospitals, 317 JAMA 2105, 2107–10 (2017) (finding lower mortality rates at teach-
ing hospitals for a range of common medical conditions, and finding that major teaching 
hospitals did better than minor teaching hospitals); John Z. Ayanian & Joel S. Weissman, 
Teaching Hospitals and Quality of Care: A Review of the Literature, 80 MILBANK Q. 569, 
574–77 (2002) (reviewing the literature). But see Andrew M. Ibrahim et al., Association of 
Hospital Critical Access Status with Surgical Outcomes and Expenditures Among Medicare 
Beneficiaries, 315 JAMA 2095, 2096–99 (2016) (finding critical access rural hospitals 
performed as well as noncritical access non-rural hospitals on common surgeries). 
160. See, e.g., Lisa Rapaport, Teaching Hospitals in U.S. Are Expensive, But Have Lower 
Death Rates, REUTERS (May 23, 2017 3:59 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
hospitals-usa-mortality-idUSKBN18J2UG [https://perma.cc/6VZD-JED3]; Nuckols et al., 
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To the extent that providers in high-resource settings tend to 
choose more intense, more costly interventions, medical AI will learn 
those patterns and recommend them when translated to low-resource 
settings. Such effects may develop over time. If an algorithm continu-
ally suggests that patients get PET scans, for instance, and a commu-
nity hospital does not have a PET scanner, obviously the patient 
cannot get that scan at that time. But providers in that hospital may 
note the continued recommendations and push for the hospital to buy 
a PET scanner to comport with the algorithm, resulting in higher costs 
over time. Such higher costs may be warranted — perhaps the hospi-
tal really needs a PET scanner to provide appropriate care efficiently 
and effectively. But in other cases, the AI may just suggest the more 
expensive option because that option is more prevalent in high-
resource contexts, when a lower-cost option may be more appropriate 
for the lower-resource context. 
 This pattern is likely to result in anti-frugal effects. Although 
medical AI may reduce some costs — presumably, software is cheap-
er to run than an additional diagnostician is to hire — it may increase 
other costs by systematically changing preferred patterns of care to 
more closely match those at high-resource, more expensive care set-
tings.161 Overall, translation between contexts looks to have problem-
atic effects on both the quality of care and the cost of care. 
V. ISN’T ALL MEDICINE CONTEXTUAL? 
On being presented with these translational challenges, one might 
ask: isn’t all medicine contextual anyway? That is to say, isn’t it the 
case that all medicine depends on the particular patient in front of the 
particular provider, the evidence upon which the intervention is based 
and in what populations that evidence was developed, and the re-
sources available to the provider in the immediate medical encoun-
ter? 162  This Part gives three replies to this question: first, even if 
medical AI is just contextual like other medicine, that is worth noting; 
second, the opacity of medical AI may hide contextual changes that 
would otherwise be noticed; and third, the rhetoric and development 
                                                                                                    
supra note 158. But see Laura G. Burke et al., Comparison of Costs of Care for Medicare 
Patients Hospitalized in Teaching and Nonteaching Hospitals, JAMA NETWORK OPEN 
(June 7, 2019), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2735462 
[https://perma.cc/M2EL-Y677] (presenting recent findings that indicate teaching hospitals 
may not necessarily be as expensive as previously thought). 
161. These increases in care complexity and intensity may have differential effects on 
different patient populations, as well. Poorer patients are less able to undergo frequent fol-
low-up visits, for instance, so a shift to more intensive follow-up care may disproportionate-
ly affect those patients. 
162. In an even more direct comparison, doctors who work in low-resource contexts are 
themselves typically trained in high-resource academic medical centers (that’s what makes 
them academic medical centers). But they adapt their practice to their new contexts. 
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of medical AI suggests that contextual dependence will not be a prob-
lem, making its existence more striking. The next Part addresses a 
different set of issues, focusing on how medicine already deals with 
contextual knowledge, and why those tools work less well for medical 
AI. 
First, even if the ultimate conclusion from this work is only that 
medical AI is contextual like other types of medicine, and that its con-
textual effects may be concentrated across the gradient of resources, 
that is worth knowing. Medical AI has the apparent promise of ad-
dressing contextual challenges in medicine by distributing expertise 
and by taking account of patient variations to make care especially 
precise — and hopefully, it will fulfill that promise! But unless the 
status quo is changed, medical AI is subject to its own set of contex-
tual biases. It is not an automatic panacea. 
Second, opacity makes it potentially harder to spot problems that 
may arise from contextual bias than to spot parallel problems in well-
understood systems. Medical AI is black-box medicine; it is difficult 
to know how it makes its recommendations.163 This opacity makes it 
hard to spot the problems of contextual bias when they appear. If a 
provider consults a Physician’s Desk Reference and sees that a partic-
ular treatment option is generally preferred but requires more re-
sources to perform well than are available in a low-resource setting, 
she can decide to pursue a less effective but more practical option. But 
if this recommendation comes from an algorithm with no reasoning 
given — it might be based on specific patient characteristics, or the 
particulars of the diagnosis, or something else — it is harder to know 
whether that recommendation or some alternative is the better 
choice.164 Thus, medical AI’s contextual bias may be harder to under-
stand and to rectify than in other medical situations.  
Third and most importantly, the nature of machine-learning sys-
tems and the possibility of self-improvement provides an illusory 
safety rail. This requires some unpacking. For other medical technol-
ogies, we recognize (or, at least, we’re starting to recognize) that the 
technology is developed in a specific context and might not work so 
well when deployed in other contexts. When the clinical trials used to 
approve a drug include no pregnant women, we recognize — or 
should — that evidence for its safe and effective use in pregnant 
women is lacking.165 Perhaps more pointedly, whether or not the drug 
works safely for pregnant women, we don’t expect the drug to change. 
                                                                                                    
163. See, e.g., Price, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, supra note 98, at 429–31. 
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But that’s not true for medical AI. Machine-learning systems hold out 
the possibility of improvement; it’s right there in the name. Data from 
deployment and use can be used to improve the algorithms so that 
they get better over time.166 And so we might reasonably be more op-
timistic about context-specificity in medical AI: while the algorithm 
isn’t perfect when it starts, it will learn from deployment contexts and 
improve. But that safeguard is illusory. Contexts where medical AI is 
likely to run into problems are precisely the contexts where we lack 
the data needed to improve its performance: low-resource environ-
ments that lack the data infrastructure to train, improve, or even eval-
uate algorithms.167 That lack of infrastructure doesn’t end with the 
deployment of some black-box medicine implementations. Rather, 
unless that deployment is embedded within new data infrastructure 
that itself returns data to the algorithm’s development, we should ex-
pect that any contextual problems will remain unaddressed even as the 
algorithm is used in the new context. Thus, medical AI holds out the 
promise of improvement over time, but that promise will do little to 
solve the problem of contextual bias in low-resource contexts. 
So yes — all medicine is contextual, and black-box medicine is as 
well. But given black-box medicine’s capacity for democratizing ex-
pertise, opacity, and capability for self-improvement in aspects other 
than contextual bias, bias in black-box medicine demands special at-
tention. 
VI. SOLUTIONS 
The problem of contextual bias in medical AI is likely to dampen 
the potential benefits of democratizing medical expertise. Reducing 
this problem will be tricky. This Part discusses several possible solu-
tions and closes with a discussion of traps to avoid in implementing 
them. 
Two fairly obvious solutions for the quality problem both have 
real challenges. First, for several reasons, “humans-in-the-loop” — 
providers who can review and implement care options — won’t pre-
vent the problems above, though they may sometimes ameliorate 
them. Second, labeling of medical AI based on how and where it was 
trained faces substantial difficulties in implementation, and even if it 
works as intended, will not solve the problem. 
Two quality solutions have more promise. First, public invest-
ment in data infrastructure can help tackle the problem at the front-
                                                                                                    
166. See Burrell, supra note 164, at 5; see also Ariel Bleicher, Demystifying the Black 
Box that is AI, SCI. AM. (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ 
demystifying-the-black-box-that-is-ai [https://perma.cc/3946-VCYY]. 
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end by increasing the representativeness of data on which medical AI 
is trained. Second, regulatory requirements of at least some evidence 
of cross-contextual efficacy will reduce the incentives developers face 
to develop medical AI only in high-resource contexts. 
Cost is its own tremendous tangle of issues; I briefly discuss how 
we might think through addressing it. 
Finally, a coda considers three traps to avoid: too much contextu-
alization, too little contextualization, and the innovation-stunting pa-
ralysis of the Nirvana fallacy. 
A. Provider Safeguards and Humans-in-the-loop 
Why doesn’t the presence of human providers in care settings re-
solve the concerns described above? Medical practice already incor-
porates variation between different contexts; different doctors have 
different preferred strategies, and patients are different everywhere. 
The way we tend to resolve this is by relying on providers at the point 
of care to make the decision that is most appropriate for the patient in 
front of them — the original version of “personalized medicine.” Why 
doesn’t that work here to avoid these problems? I posit four reasons of 
increasing force: (1) present provider ignorance; (2) reliance on algo-
rithms; (3) future provider ignorance; and (4) provider absence. Each 
reduces the force providers can bring to bear to correct translational 
errors of medical AI — and, more generally, should decrease our con-
fidence in relying on “human-in-the-loop” safety mechanisms for 
medical AI. 
1. Present Provider Ignorance 
First, providers often don’t know what the best options are, and 
therefore may not be suited to exercise independent corrective judg-
ment on the decisions of algorithms. Famously, a large fraction of 
medicine as practiced is not evidence-based. 168  Providers may not 
know which option is preferable in general among a menu of options, 
much less what treatment is preferable for the specific patient in front 
of them or in the specific resource context of the medical encounter. 
The examples from current practice listed above exemplify this pat-
tern; it may be the wrong call to undertake surgical removal of 
                                                                                                    
168. See, e.g., Diana Herrera-Perez et al., A Comprehensive Review of Randomized Clini-
cal Trials in Three Medical Journals Reveals 396 Medical Reversals, ELIFE, June 11, 2019, 
at 1, 5–12, https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.45183.001 [https://perma.cc/WS22-LCSQ] (cata-
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gallbladder cancer in low-resource settings, but some providers still 
choose those options. Why would we assume that providers would 
somehow acquire the knowledge to correct the errors of medical AI 
when they currently make at least some similar errors in practice 
without AI present?169 
2. Reliance on Algorithms 
Second, even if providers currently know what the ideal diagnos-
tic or treatment pathway is, they may not actually exercise independ-
ent judgment when confronted with an algorithm providing a different 
conclusion. Automation bias refers to a phenomenon where individu-
als rely on the results of automation even when they know or should 
know that the automation is wrong.170 Sometimes, the individuals fol-
low incorrect recommendations (commission errors), and sometimes 
they fail to notice problems when the software does not flag them for 
review (omission errors).171 Both types of errors have been observed 
in the context of clinical decision support software in areas including 
prescriptions, mammogram interpretation, EKG interpretation, and 
clinical scenario management.172 Overall, we probably want at least 
some level of automation bias, because good software still improves 
the level of care, even if it occasionally makes mistakes.173 If provid-
ers are constantly second-guessing medical AI, we lose the benefits of 
increased performance and efficiency that they promise.174 Neverthe-
less, the presence of automation bias decreases our ability to rely on 
humans-in-the-loop to correct problems of medical AI, whether based 
on problems with contextual translation or not. 
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3. Future Provider Ignorance 
Third, even if providers currently know enough to correct the er-
rors of medical AI, that knowledge base may decrease over time as 
medical AI becomes more commonplace. Michael Froomkin, Ian 
Kerr, and Joelle Pineau have painted a picture of what might happen 
to medical practice as medical AI becomes better and more availa-
ble.175 They argue that as medical AI becomes more competent, doc-
tors will be pushed to rely on it by, among other things, medical 
malpractice, and that over time doctors will lose the knowledge neces-
sary to practice medicine well and to know how well medical AI is 
performing.176 One need not accept their argument wholesale to be-
lieve that as medical AI comes to perform at at-or-above human levels 
on some medical tasks, and to be widely available, the incentives for 
providers to train in those tasks will substantially decrease. This ten-
dency will likely interact with the automation bias described immedi-
ately above, with the result that providers will be less able to catch 
errors resulting from problems in medical AI. 
4. Provider Absence 
Fourth and finally, all the models of humans-in-the-loop to reduce 
errors from medical AI, including contextual translation errors, rely 
on humans actually being present to take their place in the loop. But 
this is quite an assumption and will often be wrong. Consider again 
the benefit of medical AI on which this work focuses: the possibility 
of democratizing expertise, making high-level medical expertise 
available to those who otherwise might not have it. When we assume 
the presence of a skilled provider who can oversee the recommenda-
tions of medical AI, in a partnership rather than a replacement model, 
and can correct errors of the sort discussed above, we assume away 
this problem that medical AI can help us fix. Of course, a skilled sur-
geon can recognize the problems of trying to remove gallbladder can-
cer without the right operating tools, and could countermand the 
recommendation of medical AI to proceed — but what about the 
common situation where there is no skilled surgeon present? An ex-
cellent pathologist may recognize the mistakes of an AI-provided di-
agnosis of a particular pathology slide, but often there will be no 
excellent pathologist available, especially in the type of lower-
resource settings on which this work focuses. 
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In low-resource medical settings, we simply cannot assume the 
presence of practitioners with the right set of knowledge to recognize 
and fix the suboptimal recommendations medical AI may provide 
when its insights translate poorly to that exact low-resource context. 
Whether we are talking about community health centers, community 
hospitals, solo practitioners, or rural health settings with very limited 
provider availability, those settings will lack many types of exper-
tise — and again, that’s precisely the point of medical AI.177 This is 
not to say that human-in-the-loop is not a laudable model; there are 
reasons to prefer rich provider involvement178 (though there are also 
reasons to circumscribe that involvement179), and reasons to suspect 
that in high-resource contexts skilled providers will be unwilling to 
cede responsibility to medical AI.180 But relying on humans to catch 
AI errors will not work in many contexts where medical AI promises 
to do a tremendous amount of good. 
B. Labeling 
Labeling medical AI to provide more information to users pro-
vides a solution that is both obvious and problematic. It is obvious 
because labeling is a common and straightforward way to recognize 
the limitations of technology, especially medical technology. It is 
problematic for three reasons. First, it is unclear how to label medical 
AI appropriately to recognize the problem of contextual bias. Second, 
providers often ignore medical labels and use technologies “off-
label.” Third, even if providers follow labeling restrictions about 
where to use medical AI, such a path hobbles the goal of democratiz-
ing medical expertise. 
Labeling could mean two distinct things in this context: the more 
general labels that give instructions for any product, or FDA-
mandated labeling. Labels are familiar in many regulated contexts;181 
                                                                                                    
177. See supra Section II.C.2. 
178. See Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Stephen E. Henderson, Artificial Intelligence and 
Role-Reversible Judgment, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 146–48 (2019); Selbst & 
Barocas, supra note 174, at 1138–39. 
179. For instance, if providers consistently second-guess the recommendations of algo-
rithms, and the algorithms perform at a higher level than the average provider, provider 
reversal will on average lessen the quality of recommendations. See Price, Medical Mal-
practice, supra note 106, at 299–305 (discussing this dynamic); Selbst & Barocas, supra 
note 174, at 1129. 
180. Among other things, for the foreseeable future, providers are likely to bear ultimate 
responsibility for final medical decisions. See Price, Medical Malpractice, supra note 106, 
at 303. But see Cabitza et al., supra note 176, at 517 (noting provider willingness to defer to 
algorithms). 
181. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Dis-
closure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011) (surveying mandatory disclosure regimes). 
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cigarettes carry warnings about potential health risks182 and food car-
ries labels stating nutrition content.183 Labeling relies on a combina-
tion of disclosure and choice: product users should be able to choose 
how and whether to use a particular product, but they should be in-
formed about the salient facts before making that choice (particularly 
if those facts are hard for users to discern on their own).184 
The FDA mandates its own specific form of labeling for products 
it regulates, including drugs and medical devices — which as de-
scribed above, will typically include medical AI.185 Labels for medical 
devices must include adequate direction for use, including 
“[s]tatements of all conditions, purposes, or uses for which such de-
vice is intended.”186 Use outside those conditions, just like for drugs, 
is “off-label use.”187 The rest of this Section will assume the existence 
of an FDA-approved label for medical AI as a medical device, but 
similar arguments apply to non-FDA-approved labeling that just dis-
closes information about a product to inform users. 
Determining what information should go on a medical AI label 
will be hard. Ideally, a label would provide enough information such 
that those choosing to deploy it in a new context would know how 
well to expect the algorithm to perform in that context, and what types 
of failure or errors might be expected — and we don’t know that yet. 
This Article has sought to open that conversation — mentioning, 
among other things, patient composition and resource availability 
(broadly defined) of the setting in which the algorithm was trained. 
But to really know how to impose labeling requirements that contain 
enough information to inform use meaningfully, we need to know a 
lot more about the relevant sources of patient and provider variation 
                                                                                                    
182. See, e.g., Kristin M. Sempeles, Note, The FDA’s Attempt to Scare the Smoke Out of 
You: Has the FDA Gone Too Far with the Nine New Cigarette Warning Labels?, 117 PA. 
ST. L. REV. 223, 232–35 (2012) (describing the labeling regime); see also Sara C. Hitchman 
et al., Changes in Effectiveness of Cigarette Health Warnings Over Time in Canada and the 
United States, 2002–2011, 16 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 536, 536 (2013) (evaluating the 
effectiveness of warning labels). 
183. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990). 
184. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 181, at 649–50. 
185. See supra Section III.C.1. 
186. 21 C.F.R. § 801.5 (2019); see also FDA, General Device Labeling Requirements, 
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/device-labeling/general-device-labeling-requirements 
[https://perma.cc/8U4W-SH69] (citing 21 C.F.R. § 801.5 (2019)). 
187. See, e.g., Randall S. Stafford, Off-Label Use of Drugs and Medical Devices: A Re-
view of Policy Implications, 91 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 920, 920 
(2012) (providing an overview of off-label use of drugs and devices); Jamie S. Sutherell et 
al., Pediatric Interventional Cardiology in the United States is Dependent on the Off-Label 
Use of Medical Devices, 5 CONGENITAL HEART DISEASE 2, 2–3 (2010) (finding that half of 
all pediatric cardiac interventions involved an off-label use and that 99% of stent implanta-
tions were off-label). 
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than we know now.188 This is not to say that such labeling is a futile 
enterprise, but it will be difficult to get right. 
More problematic is how labels are actually used or not used in 
clinical care. In general, transparency is of limited efficacy in shaping 
the use of technology, though it is a commonly-prescribed solution.189 
Off-label use of drugs is famously common.190 Perhaps unsurprising-
ly, some of the most common off-label uses, such as pediatric use 
without trials to support pediatric approval, 191 mimic common gaps in 
health big data. And although drug labels rarely specify that they are 
principally tested in relatively ancestrally homogeneous populations, 
we might think of the widespread use of drugs or other treatments in 
ancestral minorities in whom the treatments were not originally tested 
as a sort of ersatz off-label use. So, too, we should expect that medical 
AI would be used off-label just as other medical treatments are.192 If 
an algorithm were trained in a relatively limited population, then us-
ing it in another population would be unsurprising — especially if the 
algorithm otherwise seems to be a good tool, trained on data from 
doctors in a high-resource setting.193 
Third, finally, and most importantly: even if labels are well-
designed and even if providers actually follow them — that just gets 
us back to the original problem. Recall the key goal of medical AI 
that drives the issue of translation across contexts (and the rest of this 
work): democratizing medical expertise, and allowing the provision of 
excellent medical care in settings where it might otherwise be outside 
the capabilities of providers in that setting. If labels state that medical 
AI is developed in high-resource settings with relatively limited pa-
tient populations and should be limited to similar situations, and if 
providers follow those labels to avoid using the medical AI in low-
resource settings with different patient populations, then the medical 
AI doesn’t actually democratize expertise at all. Respecting limita-
                                                                                                    
188. One parallel solution is to just let the algorithms sort all of this variation out, such 
that rather than labels noting variation, the algorithms themselves take all relevant variation 
into account. But this begs the question — that solution requires that algorithms be devel-
oped with enough data to see that range of variation, which by hypothesis throughout this 
piece is not the case. 
189. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 181, at 679. But see Ryan Bubb, 
TMI? Why the Optimal Architecture of Disclosure Remains TBD, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 
1042 (2015) (arguing for the effectiveness of some disclosures). 
190. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 2 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 731 nn.62–63 (2005) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Problem of New 
Uses]. 
191. See Sutherell et al., supra note 187, at 2–3. 
192. One could imagine technological limitations built into algorithms, such that an algo-
rithm trained only on adults, for instance, would simply not provide a recommendation in a 
pediatric case. This would be challenging to implement and would also not solve the imme-
diately following problem. 
193. See supra Section III.B (describing the reputational benefit of training in high-
resource settings). 
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tions of algorithmic development by avoiding potentially problematic 
contexts is like responding to the problem of biased policing by keep-
ing police out of minority neighborhoods entirely: it may decrease the 
problem of bias, but it also loses any potential benefit that the tech-
nology or intervention might give to those in the second context.194 
Labeling may still have some benefit. If, for instance, providers or 
other purchasers of medical AI actually do follow restrictive labeling, 
then developers would face incentives to demonstrate cross-context 
efficacy to obtain a broader label and therefore broader use.195 But 
this assumes that labels are closely followed, and also that the re-
sources available in low-resource settings are sufficient to outweigh 
incentives to focus development on high-resource settings — assump-
tions that are easy to challenge. On the other hand, training-based la-
bels might be of more use when combined with two other 
interventions: investment in data infrastructure and regulatory man-
dates for cross-context efficacy data. 
C. Representative Datasets 
A third way to ameliorate problems in contextual translation in-
volves addressing the root of the issue: the initial training data. If the 
existing dynamic is principally driven by data location — High-
Resource Hospitals are where the data are196 — then policymakers 
could push to generate and collect more data to change that initial 
condition. The public — and by public, here I largely mean the gov-
ernment, whether state or federal197 — can invest in two types of data 
infrastructure. 198  First, it can invest in infrastructure for data: re-
sources like computer servers, personnel, standards, and procedures 
that let data be collected, controlled for quality, and made available at 
lower-resource settings such as community health centers.199 The pub-
lic can also invest in the infrastructure of data: large collections of 
                                                                                                    
194. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Sebst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 689–90 (2016); I. Glenn Cohen & Harry S. Graver, Cops, Docs, and 
Code: A Dialogue Between Big Data in Health Care and Predictive Policing, 51 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 437, 443–44 (2018). 
195. See Eisenberg, Problem of New Uses, supra note 190, at 734–35. 
196. See supra Section III.A. 
197. Private investors could also invest in funding such data infrastructure, but private 
investment in infrastructure tends to be socially suboptimal because private actors cannot 
adequately capture the spillover benefits that infrastructural goods provide for other innova-
tors and downstream users. See BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL 
VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 66 (2012); Price, Risk and Resilience, supra note 32, at 77–
78. Private firms also have incentives to keep data collected as trade secrets to maintain 
competitive advantage, which causes problems both for data aggregation across firms and 
for external validation of medical AI models. See Price, Big Data, supra note 71, at 1432–
35. 
198. Price, Risk and Resilience, supra note 32, at 78–79. 
199. Id. 
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data that can enable broad sets of future innovation and economic ac-
tivity, such as developing black-box medical algorithms.200 
Investing in infrastructure for data could take several forms. Most 
obviously, grants specifically directed to support the purchase of 
computer systems or the hiring of data personnel could ameliorate the 
data acquisition problem of low-resource settings.201 Less obviously, 
governments can set standards, which themselves are a sort of infra-
structure. Electronic health records currently use a hodgepodge of 
formats due to an early decision not to federally mandate a centralized 
format; this situation has resulted in problems of interoperability and 
data fragmentation.202 The federal government is moving to address 
interoperability problems, but could and probably should go further to 
require standards for electronic health records.203 Government efforts 
could also ease the burden of developing data infrastructure: adding a 
research exemption to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, for instance, would 
make it easier for low-resource settings to collect data by removing 
one set of legal concerns.204 
The advantage of public funding of infrastructure for and of data, 
whether through grant funding or direct spending, is that such infra-
structure does not have to follow the pre-existing patterns of what is 
collected and where. Instead, data collected through a public infra-
structure effort can better represent the care that many patients actual-
ly experience. 205  If high-quality data are collected about a wide 
variety of patients, the concerns about effects from different patient 
populations decrease.206 And if data are collected about a wider range 
of care settings — not just High-Resource Hospitals, but community 
hospitals, community health centers, practitioner’s offices, and the 
like — those data can more accurately reflect the resources available 
in the care setting, the range of practices followed, the types of treat-
ment implemented, and the outcomes that result.207 
                                                                                                    
200. Id.; see also Price, Big Data, supra note 71, at 1439–44 (proposing an infrastructure 
model for gathering data to promote the development of black-box medical algorithms); 
MATHENY ET AL., supra note 4, at 169–71 (arguing that, for medical AI to reach its poten-
tial, datasets must be conceptualized as a “public good”). 
201. Even here, there may be backlash along the lines of, “Why fund data when we have 
insufficient funding for care?” The awkward answer is that better, broader data make future 
care better and cheaper — but that may be a difficult sell to those facing resource gaps. 
202. Julia Adler-Milstein, Moving Past the EHR Interoperability Blame Game, NEJM 
CATALYST (July 18, 2017), http://catalyst.nejm.org/ehr-interoperability-blame-game 
[https://perma.cc/BPT7-4SLM]. 
203. Id. 
204. See Price, Drug Approval, supra note 77, at 2460–61. In fact, an earlier draft of the 
21st Century Cures Act included such a provision, but it was removed in the final text. Id. 
205. Indeed, grant funding involving data collection could be conditioned on a require-
ment that data be more representative. 
206. See supra Section IV.A.1. 
207. This data collection goal is essential to the development of a learning health system 
more broadly. See Elizabeth A. McGlynn et al., Developing a Data Infrastructure for a 
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The difficulty of this endeavor should also not be minimized. 
There are reasons that data collection practices today are as they 
are.208 Gathering data well is hard and can be expensive.209 Privacy 
concerns are also implicated in the gathering, use, and sharing of large 
amounts of sensitive health data.210 Nevertheless, investment in those 
data-gathering capacities — across many contexts — is likely to pay 
substantial dividends down the line, including in those same low-
resource contexts. 
The NIH’s All of Us initiative is a prominent example of exactly 
this type of infrastructural investment in data.211 All of Us (formerly 
the Precision Medicine Cohort) is a part of the Precision Medicine 
Initiative. 212  Through All of Us, the NIH plans to gather detailed 
health information — including genetic sequences, treatment infor-
mation, and outcome data — from over one million Americans. Cru-
cially, the sample population for All of Us is meant to be nationally 
representative.213 According to Francis Collins, the Director of the 
NIH, the program has a goal that half of its participants come from 
traditionally underrepresented groups.214 If the definition of diversity 
is broadened to include socioeconomic status and rural status, then the 
                                                                                                    
Learning Health System: The PORTAL Network, 21 J. AM. INFORMATICS ASS’N 596, 598–
600 (2014). Increased data infrastructure also allows other types of innovation and meas-
urements of health system quality more generally. Id. 
208. See supra Section III.A. 
209. Id. Secondary questions also arise as to the best allocation of resources. One might 
argue that any new resources allocated to low-resource medical contexts should be aimed 
directly at improving care rather than improving data infrastructure. That calculus is com-
plex. I argue here only that investment in data infrastructure in low-resource contexts will 
benefit patients in those contexts down the road, not that such investment is the best use of 
scarce resources. However, infrastructure is often a useful investment, considering the 
amount by which it can increase innovation and future welfare. See, e.g., W. Nicholson 
Price II, Grants, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 59 (2019) (discussing the role of government 
grants in providing infrastructure for future innovation). 
210. I have examined the privacy concerns of medical big data and medical AI in some 
detail elsewhere. See Roger Allan Ford & W. Nicholson Price II, Privacy and Accountabil-
ity in Black-Box Medicine, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2016) (dis-
cussing the privacy challenges of medical AI in general and noting the tension between 
third-party validation and privacy protections); Price, Drug Approval, supra note 77, at 
2458 (describing the limitations HIPAA and other privacy rules place on the innovation of a 
learning health system where patient data are constantly used to improve medical 
knowledge); W. Nicholson Price II & I. Glenn Cohen, Privacy in the Age of Medical Big 
Data, 25 NATURE MED. 37, 42 (2019) (surveying the privacy landscape for medical big data 
and arguing against a “privacy maximalist” approach). 
211. See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, All of Us Research Program, https://allofus.nih.gov 
[https://perma.cc/T2B9-6Z3D]. Other examples include the UK Biobank. See Editorial, UK 
Biobank Data on 500,000 People Paves Way to Precision Medicine, NATURE (Oct. 10, 
2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-06950-9 [https://perma.cc/WK9U-
GJZW]. 
212. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 211. 
213. Id. 
214 Francis Collins, Keynote: An Update on All of Us, PROC. PRECISION MED. WORLD 
CONF. (June 6, 2018). 
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NIH plans to draw 75% of participants from diverse groups more gen-
erally.215 This goal speaks directly to diversity and representativeness 
of patient population, and at least indirectly to the diversity of medical 
contexts, given that many of these participants are likely to seek med-
ical care in low-resource contexts.216 Efforts like All of Us should be 
supported, continued, and expanded. 
To be clear, more representative datasets do not need to be pub-
licly funded. The dynamics described in Part III make non-
representative data an easy default for private parties, but private par-
ties could also seek to address it (especially if required to as described 
immediately below). One approach could blend private spending on 
infrastructure for data with private acquisition of data. If developers 
sought data from low-resource contexts but recognized that those con-
texts lacked the resources to generate high-quality data, those devel-
opers could themselves provide the resources — technological or 
personnel-based — in exchange for access to the data generated, 
which would then fuel better performance down the road. 
D. FDA Regulation and Concordance 
The FDA could also play a role in decreasing problems of contex-
tual translation. As described above, the reliance on data from High-
Resource Hospitals may be over-determined: not only are data cur-
rently found in high-resource contexts, but using data from those con-
texts also helps avoid risks arising from FDA regulation, tort liability, 
and insurance reimbursement pathways. To help reduce these pres-
sures to focus medical AI training on data from a limited set of medi-
cal contexts, the FDA approval process for medical AI products could 
be shifted to require explicit concordance data and demonstration of 
cross-context performance. 
The FDA could explicitly require that developers seeking clear-
ance or approval for medical devices using AI or machine learning 
include concordance data demonstrating performance in contexts out-
side the original development context.217 More specifically, if an algo-
rithm proposes to recommend treatment pathways based on patient 
characteristics, FDA could require that the validation of those path-
ways consider not only the high-resource contexts where the algo-
                                                                                                    
215. Id. 
216. See supra Section IV.A.1. 
217. The FDA could implement such requirements for other technology, including other 
algorithms; however, as described in this Article, black-box algorithms are particularly 
worrisome and therefore merit special attention. 
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rithm was developed but also low-resource contexts where it is likely 
to be deployed.218 
A requirement for low-resource concordance demonstrations 
would not be trivial. In the current state of the world, low-resource 
contexts will often have insufficient data to allow purely data-based 
validation. 219  Thus, demonstrating concordance now might require 
extra clinical trials, which are costly and don’t always match well 
with the development of black-box medicine.220 Implementation of 
better data infrastructure — ideally, of a data-based learning health 
system more broadly — should eventually decrease the difficulty of 
validation of performance in different environments.221 The near term 
is likely to be messy. But FDA requirements and infrastructural in-
vestments could interact in a self-sustaining cycle: infrastructural in-
vestments in data can help support the ability to demonstrate 
concordance to FDA, while FDA requirements to demonstrate con-
cordance would encourage data infrastructure investment. 
While FDA requirements for concordance would be unusual, such 
requirements have some precedent. The FDA already encourages 
greater gender, racial, and ethnic diversity among clinical trial partici-
pants, though it does not require it.222 Clinical research funded by the 
NIH has even stronger diversity requirements; in 1993, Congress 
passed the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act, which re-
quired the NIH Director to ensure inclusion of women and minorities 
in clinical research. 223  These requirements are not squarely on 
point — the NIH policy stems from grant funding of clinical trials, 
and FDA encouragement is voluntary — but they demonstrate a simi-
lar commitment to ensuring that clinical trials show that treatments 
work in different groups. 
                                                                                                    
218. See, e.g., Performance, supra note 43, at 4–5 (describing clinical trial testing IDx-
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219. See supra Section III.A; see also Ford & Price, supra note 210, at 18–21 (2016) 
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supra Section VI.C. 
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FDA involvement in demonstrating concordance and applicability 
across contexts could also help resolve the other two legal incentives 
currently pushing for development based on high-resource data: tort 
liability and insurance reimbursement.224 When FDA approves a med-
ical device as a Class III device (i.e., a higher-risk device) under its 
premarket approval pathway, state tort liability is largely preempted 
for that device under Riegel v. Medtronic.225 Thus, at least for compa-
nies that pursue Class III premarket approvals — and assuming that 
concordance data helps persuade FDA to grant such approvals — tort 
liability concerns should also largely be resolved by that process.226 
This doesn’t resolve all liability concerns. Bringing a device to market 
through the 510(k) preclearance pathway (i.e., a finding that the de-
vice has an already-approved predicate device on the market) does not 
preempt state tort lawsuits,227 and so far developers have been able to 
use that pathway (or de novo classification228) and to bring devices to 
market as Class I or Class II devices rather than undergoing the costli-
er premarket approval pathway for Class III devices.229 
Finally, FDA approval, especially if that process includes con-
cordance data, should help resolve issues of insurer reimbursement. 
As described above, FDA approval and CMS reimbursement deci-
sions are frequently linked,230 and private payers frequently follow 
CMS’s lead.231 An FDA-approved demonstration that an algorithm 
works in different contexts could similarly support payer determina-
tions that the technology is worth reimbursing across those different 
contexts, even in the absence of the current quality proxy of training 
                                                                                                    
224. See supra Sections III.C.2–3. 
225. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 345 (2008). 
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114, at 2311. 
231. Eisenberg & Price, supra note 80, at 31–32. 
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on data from high-resource medical contexts. Such FDA approval 
incentives could be even stronger if reimbursement is greater for de-
vices that go through full premarket approval rather than 510(k) clear-
ance — a difference that CMS currently is pressing.232 
FDA approval modifications will not be a panacea, of course; in-
surers may still prefer the cachet of high-resource settings and devel-
opers may also seek the prima facie liability reduction that could 
come with name-brand training data. Persuading providers and health 
systems to adopt black-box medical systems may also still be easier 
while partnering prominently with High-Resource Hospitals.233 But 
linking FDA approval, with its concomitant benefits, to a develop-
ment process that at least attempts to ensure validity across contextual 
translation may help ease the path to broadly useful medical AI. 
E. Incorporating Cost 
The cost problem is extremely tough. As described above, algo-
rithms that learn about the right kind of care in high-resource settings 
may simultaneously learn that the right kind of care is an expensive 
form of care, with many interventions and fancy, costly tools.234 This 
may sometimes even be correct; sometimes, high-intervention care is 
the right way to go, and some costly interventions rightly spread from 
high-resource contexts to low-resource contexts. But it also creates 
the possibility for AI acting as a vector in increasing costs in a system 
which sorely needs to reduce costs, and in which AI has at least the 
potential to contribute to that reduction.235 
A potential solution is easy to state but hard to implement. The 
most straightforward way for AI algorithms to address cost issues 
would be to add those issues to the AI’s optimization function: that is, 
when scoring outcomes as desirable or undesirable (for the purposes 
of care recommendations, at least), the cost of care could be included 
in the score, rather than just patient health measures. Algorithms 
would then prioritize not simply outcomes or duplicating the patterns 
prevalent in High-Resource Hospitals, but also cost-effectiveness. 
Implementing such measures could be quite challenging, espe-
cially since in the U.S. rationing health dollars is a hot-button issue.236 
And, at least in a fee-for-service system, which still exists in many 
contexts, provider and health system incentives typically push for 
more care, and costlier care, rather than efficient and cost-effective 
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care. It seems more likely that the first medical AI systems focused on 
cost will aim to promote revenue maximization rather than efficien-
cy.237 But building costs into the initial models could eventually help 
some AI systems reduce system costs, assuming that cost reduction 
becomes a goal of system developers. 
F. Traps to Avoid 
Figuring out how best to develop and to deploy AI to democratize 
medical expertise is hard. It’s made harder because contextual bias is 
not the only challenge that medical AI faces. If we try too hard to 
eliminate contextual bias, we could wind up with any of three related 
problems: too much contextualization, insufficient contextualization, 
or inadequate adoption.238 
First, pushing too hard to ensure that AI is trained for each con-
text could result in too much contextualization. One potential solution 
to the problem of contextual bias is to train AI in a wide variety of 
contexts so that every context has its own AI matched specifically to 
it. But the health system is rife with disparity, and AI might replicate 
or enhance those disparities.239 Not only do many low-resource con-
texts lack the capacity to generate the data to train medical AI, or to 
support the training and validation necessary once those data are gath-
ered, any AI that might result would be trained on a context with, by 
definition, a lack of resource-based expertise. Medical AI trained in 
health centers in rural India would avoid any problems of contextual 
bias when translated to other rural Indian health centers (or perhaps to 
other developing-world rural health centers), but it would lack the 
benefit of being trained on providers with the most extensive training, 
tools, and experience in high-resource settings. Such an approach 
would democratize only limited forms of medical expertise and would 
leave much of the benefit of medical AI on the table.240 
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berg & Price, supra note 80, at 16–18. 
238. A separate and complex set of issues concerns the distributional effects of efforts to 
ensure broad applicability — why not just allow medical AI to be developed for those in 
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work. 
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Second, trying to avoid variation in algorithmic performance in 
different contexts could result in too little contextualization. In an ide-
al world, medical AI would be able to take advantage of differences in 
resources. If a hospital has a top-notch PET scanner and very experi-
enced surgeons, AI algorithms that make recommendations should 
consider those options within the set of possibilities. In an ideal world, 
everyone would have access to the best care, but that is not our world, 
and not all hospitals have such resources. We don’t want medical AI 
never to suggest using a PET scanner or undertaking a risky surgery 
just because those are unhelpful or actively harmful suggestions in 
some medical contexts. And patient populations do differ, both as 
groups and as individuals; medical AI should be able to take account 
of those differences as well.241 Part of the appeal of black-box medi-
cine is the possibility of intensely personalized analysis and recom-
mendations for care; requiring too stringent replicability across 
contexts might sacrifice some of that precision. Those designing con-
cordance policies need to tread a middle path. 
Third, focusing too much on these problems — contextual bias, 
too much contextualization, and insufficient contextualization — 
could result in decisionmakers throwing up their hands and avoiding 
the new problems that come with medical AI, preferring the status 
quo. This is the Nirvana fallacy, where new options are compared to 
perfection rather than a flawed status quo.242 But the status quo itself 
already has lots of problems, some of which form the impetus for 
medical AI in the first place.243 The promise of democratizing exper-
tise is enticing precisely because we have too few experts, and many 
patients face barriers to accessing high-quality care in all but the high-
est-resource settings. Avoiding the adoption of medical AI because it 
might not work as well in low-resource contexts does nothing to aid 
patients who already lack options because of the lack of resources.244 
Ultimately, even flawed medical AI may prove transformative for 
millions of patients, and we should endeavor to see that promise even 
while we try to avoid the pitfalls of cross-context translation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Medical AI has tremendous promise to bring excellent medical 
care to those that might not otherwise see such care. Translating 
                                                                                                    
241. See Price, Black-Box Medicine, supra note 2, at 425–30. 
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black-box algorithms from high-resource contexts to low-resource 
contexts, though, brings the risk of problems; what works well in one 
context may not in another. If we are to avoid the risks of compromis-
ing care for those in low-resource settings, now is the time to consider 
how medical AI can be developed not just for those who already have 
access to excellent care, but for those who can benefit most from the 
advent of this new technology. 
 
